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INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the Internet has increasingly become
a source of information even for the historically computer illit-
erate.' The growing popularity of the Internet has been driven in
large part by the World Wide Web (web). The web is a system
that facilitates use of the Internet by helping users sort through
1. See generally Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First
Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 U. RICH. J.L. & TEcH. 1, 68
(Apr. 10, 1995) <http'/www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/burkhtm> (noting that "the
recent and burgeoning influx of computer neophytes," while decreasing the
level of sophistication of the average user, has also made the Internet an at-
tractive commercial marketplace); Victoria Slind-Flor, If It's Online, Why
Pay?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 1996, at Al (citing an attorney who notes that the
Internet is increasingly "used by many people who are even technophobes").
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the great mass of information available on it.2 The web uses
software that allows one document to link to and access an-
other, and so on, despite the fact that the documents may reside
on different machines in physically remote locations. The disper-
sion of data that is the Internet is thus largely overcome by the
web's ability to link related information in a manner transparent
to the user. This has helped to make the Internet into a me-
dium of mass communication and a vast commercial market-
place.
The distinction between the virtual space on which Inter-
net information seems to reside, the physical location in which
it actually resides, and the physical space from which the user
accesses it has given rise to a new body of thought-provoking
legal scholarship.4 This scholarship, still at a formative stage,
discusses how law should-or should not-be applied in a
world that seems to lack the physical territorial boundaries
2. See infra note 43.
3. Although the Internet and the web are not synonymous, "[to most
users and businesses, the World Wide Web ... is the Internet." ABA, WEB
LINKING AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTING STRATEGIES AND MODEL PROVISIONS 1
(1997) [hereinafter WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS]. Cyberspace is a "shorthand
way of referring to computer communications generally," including not just
the Internet but also online services. I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copy-
right) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 217, 217. While the terms do
have different meanings, unless the context indicates otherwise, this Article
uses "cyberspace," "Internet," and the "web" interchangably.
4. See, e.g., BORDERS IN GYBERSPACE (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson
eds., 1997) (collecting articles regarding a variety of Internet issues); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CI. LEGAL F.
207, 210-14 (suggesting that legislative changes may be inadvisable to deal
with cyberspace problems because technology is moving forward so quickly
and contending that a better approach would be to enable bargains, in part by
creating property rights to make bargains possible and creating bargaining
institutions); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55
U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994) (discussing how to decide when cyberspace issues
present new legal problems and suggesting a presumption of decentralization
in rulemaking); Hardy, supra note 3, at 236-60 (arguing that a private prop-
erty regime is appropriate in cyberspace); David R. Johnson & David Post,
Law And Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367,
1367-68 (1996) (arguing that territorial boundaries break down in cyberspace
and that law will emerge for the cyberspace community to deal with the lack
of physical borders); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the
Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 261, 263 (discussing
challenges for Internet information providers and arguing that existing law
with a few changes is sufficient); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones Of Cy-
berspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996) (discussing Johnson & Post's
work cited supra and stating that, while their work is important, the distinc-
tion between "real space law and cyberspace law... can[not] yet be sus-
tained").
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that historically have justified government's use of its regulatory
and judicial powers.5 This discussion is particularly timely be-
cause a recent flurry of litigation' strongly suggests that there is,
at best, a lack of understanding as to what law governs the In-
ternet and, at worst, broad disagreement as to what that law is.
In some respects, however, it is quite remarkable that this
discussion is only now occurring. The scientific and educa-
tional communities have used the Internet for almost thirty
years,' yet it is only recently that disputes have entered the
judicial system in a significant number. One might claim that
this trend was inevitable as information of value became avail-
able on the Internet. However, valuable information, at least
from a scientific perspective, has always been available there.
Nonetheless, the virtual world has historically been litigation
free, primarily governed by norms-or "netiquette"--rather
than by resort to the judicial system.
It seems more likely that the rise in litigation may be at-
tributed both to the increasing number of people accessing the
Internet and its emergence as a commercial marketplace. As
the number of Internet users went up dramatically over the
years, it was inevitable that the number of disputes would also
increase. Additionally, the Internet has evolved from its in-
ception as primarily a research network into a full-blown com-
mercial marketplace. While commercial traffic has exploded on
the Internet, firms are continuing to search for a business
model that will allow them to profit from Internet dealings.
One strategy is for firms to "fence" the information they
make available on the Internet and to seek remedies through
litigation from parties who breach those fences. Two primary
means are available to firms for protecting their electronically
5. The leading article on this topic is Johnson & Post, supra note 4.
There, the authors argue that existing law based on territoriality and physical
borders will not work in borderless cyberspace. They instead suggest that cy-
berspace will be largely self-regulating, drawing an analogy to the develop-
ment of the Law Merchant in commercial law. See id. at 1387-91.
6. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D.
Cal. filed May 9, 1997); Expert Pages v. Universal Networks, Inc., No. 97-1542
SI ENE (N.D. Cal. filed May 2, 1997); Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc.,
No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997); infra Part ll.B (discussing
the Ticketmaster and Total News cases). For updated listings of cyberspace-
related cases, see Cyberspace Law: Cases (last modified Sept. 23, 1997) <http'I/
www.jmls.edu/cyber/ cases/spam.html>.
7. See infra Part L.A (describing the Internet's development).
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distributed information-technology and the law.8 Technolo-
gies such as password access and encryption may function like
virtual barbed wire, denying access to the unauthorized. Copy
protection technologies may limit use once access has been
granted. At the same time, both public and private law may be
used to replace or to supplement technological fences. The
public intellectual property law and the private law of contract
and tort may regulate both access and use of information.
This Article suggests that, while it is important to discuss
how law will eventually evolve in cyberspace, it is at least as
important to fill a gap in legal thought by discussing not the
boundaries between physical and virtual space but the bounda-
ries between different sets of law. More specifically, scholars
and legislators must consider the relationship between differ-
ent branches of the public intellectual property law, particu-
larly the relationship between copyright and trademark.
Similarly, they must also consider the border between public
intellectual property law and the private law of contract and
tort, particularly misappropriation. A useful starting point for
this discussion is a critical examination of two recently filed
cases, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.9 and Washington
Post Co. v. Total News, Inc.1" These cases highlight the need
not only for an understanding of what legal rules govern be-
havior but also how they relate to each other.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the Internet and the
web to provide the background information relevant to the le-
gal issues involved. Part 11 focuses on the common Internet
practices of linking and framing and summarizes the two re-
cently filed cases that challenge those practices. Part III ad-
dresses the policy question of what the legal response to link-
ing and framing should be. This analysis suggests that,
despite tenable arguments for strong property rights in favor of
information providers, other considerations, including First
Amendment concerns, lead to the conclusion that linking and
framing should generally be permissible without the prior con-
sent of the information provider. Part IV considers the current
law. It argues that the nature of the Internet suggests that
8. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 223 (setting forth a nonexclusive list of
four ways in which information providers protect against copying, including:
"M(1) entitlement-like protection; (2) contract-like protection; (3) state-of-the-
art limitations; and (4) special-purpose technical limitations").
9. No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal. filed May 9, 1997).
10. No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
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copyright law will decline in importance in favor of unfair com-
petition law, particularly trademark. It suggests that the bor-
ders of intellectual property law in cyberspace will increasingly
be marked by trademark encroaching on areas usually gov-
erned by copyright. This analysis cautions that courts should be
reluctant to use trademark law as a means to grant copyright-
type rights and suggests that an expanded fair use doctrine in
trademark law may be desirable.
Part V of the Article discusses the interface between public
intellectual property law and the common law of contract and
tort. It contends that contracts will increasingly govern infor-
mation access and use but that public intellectual property law
will both continue to govern large parts of the Internet and act
as a limit on enforceable contractual provisions. In particular,
it argues that boilerplate notices forbidding linking should be
preempted by the Copyright Act, at least with respect to non-
commercial uses. Finally, the Article argues that the common
law doctrine of misappropriation, first enunciated in 1918,11
will often be employed in the electronic world as information
providers attempt to protect their content from exploitation by
others. This analysis suggests, however, that intellectual
property law will often preempt such actions under the test re-
cently announced by the Second Circuit in NBA v. Motorola,
Inc. 12
The Article concludes, in Part VI, by synthesizing the legal
analysis to predict how the Internet will develop. It suggests
that the Internet is likely to evolve from its current open form
of unrestricted access with information use governed primarily
by norms and public law to a system that encompasses both
open and closed areas. The closed areas are likely to be char-
acterized by use and access restrictions maintained and en-
forced through technological restrictions and public and pri-
vate law. The Article contends that this situation is not
undesirable because it should maximize both the quality and
11. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-
40 (1918) (holding that International News Service's practice of copying AP's
news constituted unfair competition). The court indicated that "defendant ... is
endeavoring to reap where it has not sown" and "appropriating to itself the
harvest of those who have sown." Id. The court further found that "[tihe
transaction [in this case] speaks for itself, and a court of equity ought not to
hesitate long in characterizing [such conduct] as unfair competition in business."
Id.
12. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). See infra notes 383-87 and accompanying
text.
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quantity of information available on the Internet without un-
duly restricting access. Thus, the law as currently consti-
tuted-with certain caveats and adjustments-is generally
well suited to deal with the Internet.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET AND THE
WORLD WIDE WEB
A. ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET
Today's Internet began evolving in the late 1960s as part
of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) ARPANET 13 project.
The DOD sought both to enable and ensure the availability of
computer communication between the government and govern-
ment-funded researchers.14 ARPANET's system developers
necessarily set it up as a network to enable communication
among physically remote users who might be using different
machines.15
In the same way that two or more computers may link to-
gether to form a network, two or more networks may link together
to form a larger network. As the ARPANET evolved, more and
more computers and networks from academia and the business
13. See John T. Delacourt, Recent Developments, The International Im-
pact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 207, 235 n.59 (1997) ('The In-
ternet evolved from the Advanced Research Project Agency Network
(ARPANET), a computer network created in 1969 by the Department of De-
fense.") (quoting Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Policies for Use of the In-
ternet, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14, 1995, at 3); see also JOHN R. LEVINE & CAROL
BAROUDI, THE INTERNET FOR DuMMIEs 11-12 (1993) ("ARPA stands for Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, the branch of Defense in charge of handing
out grant money .... [Tihe agency is now known as DARPA.").
14. See LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 13, at 11-12 (noting that the goals of
the ARPANET project included linking government and researchers together
and protecting the system against disruption); Delacourt, supra note 13, at
218 n. 59 ("ARPANET was designed to function as a decentralized national
communications network that permitted computer-to-computer communica-
tions across vast distances and was intended to withstand nuclear attack.")
(quoting Raysman & Brown, supra note 13, at 3); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (setting forth
the origins of the Internet and noting that it intentionally incorporated re-
dundancies in lindng to allow it to reroute messages to ensure that communi-
cation continued even if particular links were disabled).
15. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830 (using the term "network" to refer to "a
linked group of computers"); IBM DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 454 (10th ed.
1993) (defining "network" as, inter alia, "[an arrangement of nodes and con-
necting branches" or "[a] configuration of data processing devices and soft-
ware connected for information interchange").
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community connected to it. In 1983, to address concerns re-
garding increased usage and the need to protect sensitive in-
formation, the DOD split the system into two parts-
ARPANET for the scientific community and MILNET for the
military.1 6 This linking of two networks was the beginning of
the Internet, which is nothing more-or less-than a global
"network of networks."17 In 1986, the National Science Foun-
dation (NSF) set up its own network (NSFNET) complete with
a high-speed communications backbone as the hardware link-
ing its machines together. 18 NSFNET eventually connected to
ARPANET and, in 1990, NSFNET's backbone largely replaced
that of the ARPANET.19
The Internet itself is a network of networks linked to-
gether through routers and communications protocols that en-
able anyone connected to it to communicate with anyone else
also so connected despite differences in machinery and physical
location.20 Estimates of the number of people connected to the
Internet vary,2 but it is accurate to say that the Internet pro-
16. See BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, WORLD WIDE WEB BEBLE 38 (2d ed. 1996).
17. See id. (relating how ARPANET and MILNET were linked to form
"the first internet, a network of networks"). The term "network of networks"
is often used to define the Internet. See, e.g., Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830;
LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 13, at 8; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Proprietary
Rights in Digital Data, FED. BAR NEWS & J., Aug., 1994, at 511; Michael J.
Schmelzer, Note, Protecting the Sweat of the Spider's Brow: Current Vulner-
abilities of Internet Search Engines, 3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 12, at 4
(1997).
18. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 38 (describing how the
NSFNET was created to finther scientific communication and began by con-
necting five supercomputer centers).
19. See id. (stating that the "ARPANET backbone was decommissioned,
and its remnants were incorporated into NSFNET").
20. See Perritt, supra note 4, at 286 (noting that the Internet networks
connect through routers recognizing a communications protocol called TCP/IP
and "shar[ing] a common name and address space" and that communication
can be achieved by connecting to an Internet router).
21. See, e.g., Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831 ("[E]stimates are that as many as
40 million people around the world can and do access the... Internet....
That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by the year
1999."); Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Juris-
diction Over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241,
2244 (1997) ("Approximately thirty to sixty million individuals currently have
access to the resources found on the Internet and that number is expected ex-
ceed [sic] one hundred million by 1998."); see also Judy Leand, The Mouse
That Roared, SPORTSTYLE, Feb. 1997, at 46 (reporting that the number of
"Internet users increased from 38 million in 1994 to 56 million in 1995," 140
million in 1996, and is estimated to reach 200 million users in 1999); Can the
Internet Change Customer Services? Pharma Delegates Seminar, COMLINE
[Vol. 82:609616
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vides a means by which millions of users may communicate
with each other and access a mass of information contained on
computers linked to the Internet.'
Two characteristics that distinguish the Internet from
other communications media are its decentralization and its
openness. The system was initially designed to be decentral-
ized to guard against the disruption of communication flowing
through it.? It continued to be so as large numbers of inde-
pendent computer and network operators connected to it. 24
Simply stated, there is no central organization charged with
regulating or administering the Internet. To the extent that
regulation occurs, it does so at the point at which a user gains
access to the system. For example, many organizations that
provide Internet access have contractual agreements or policy
statements regulating use of their systems.' Additionally, in-
formal norms of "netiquette" that have developed over the
years have, historically, effectively governed the conduct of on-
line relationships.26
DAILY NEWS TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8078160 (stating that the number of Internet users has reached 60 million).
For a discussion of the inherent difficulties in measuring Internet and web
usage, see Donna L. Hoffman et al., Internet and Web Use in the U.S. (World
Wide Web), COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Dec. 1, 1996, at 36, available in
1996 WL 9011943.
22. See generally, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334-35 (1997) (describing
various modes of communication and information retrieval possible on the In-
ternet including e-mail, newsgroups, and the web).
23. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831-32 (noting that decentralization helps
achieve the goal of protecting the network from being disabled if a link were
broken and that the system enables rapid communication without human in-
tervention); George P. Long III, Comment, Who Are You? Identity and Ano-
nymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. PITr. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (1994) ("Without a for-
mal hierarchy, no central terminal is more important than any other.
Decentralization makes the Net virtually indestructible; if one computer loses
power or data, the thousands of other machines connected to the Net remain
unaffected, because the computers are not interdependent.").
24. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (noting that the system evolved as par-
ties independently linked to it using the same communication protocols).
"here is no centralized storage location, control point, or communications
channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single
entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Internet." Id.
25. See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 17, at 517 n. 8 (describing the use of
ethics policies to guide users on the network and citing Boston University's
guidelines); Nancy L. Hossfeld, The Computing Code (last modified Aug. 25,
1995) <http'/www.dartmoutedu/comp/comm/citbook/compcode.html> (setting
forth the terms of access for users at Dartmouth College to ensure privacy and
access to resources).
26. See Burk, supra note 1, 1 1.
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The decentralization of the Internet's administration is in
part responsible for its openness. Anyone with a PC and a modem
can access the Internet simply by connecting to a computer or
network already linked to it.' A user may obtain Internet ac-
cess through a variety of organizations. Many universities,
corporations, libraries, commercial on-line services, and Inter-
net service providers (ISPs) offer Internet access-some for a
fee, others free of charge.28
Once connected to the Internet, users have a wide variety
of communication methods available to them as well as a
wealth of information that they may access. Electronic mail (e-
mail) is probably the most popular use of the Internet, 29 allow-
ing users to correspond with each other much more quickly
than through the conventional mail. Newsgroups are also a
popular use of the Internet. A newsgroup is like a discussion
group and is usually dedicated to a particular topic.30 Users in-
terested in the topic may post commentary on it and read and
respond to the comments of others.31
27. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (describing hardware requirements for
accessing the Internet).
28. See id. at 832-34 (listing organizations that provide Internet access
including those set forth in the text). While Internet access may seem free to
the user, "[i]n fact, each host machine that serves as an Internet site has to
pay a fee for the privilege. Institutions recoup those fees as well as other
costs associated with use of host machines by passing them on, even if the
costs are not immediately evident because they may be bourne by a particular
unit of the institution, rather than directly by those who use the machine for
Internet services." Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Intellectual
Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext Publishing Systems, 6
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 237,244 (1993).
29. See Kenneth S. Dueker, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trade-
mark Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 483 n.3(1996) ("E-mail is the most widely used tool on the Internet.") (citation omit-
ted); Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fair-
ness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 344-
45 (1996) ("E-mail is by far the most widely used service on the internet.").
30. See Paul Zarins, Reports of ASIL Program: What's Online in Interna-
tional Law, ASIL NEwSL., Nov. 1994, available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library,
Intlr File ("Usenet newsgroups are electronic discussion groups for which
messages called news articles are available on selected host computers in-
stead of being sent directly to an individual e-mail address."); see also Long,
supra note 23, at 1181 (describing Usenet as "a network of thousands of spe-
cial interest groups that boasts millions of readers").
31. See Long, supra note 23, at 1181 ("On the Usenet, a user 'subscribes'
to a group, and then is able to send (and read) messages to other subscribers
in that group, just as one would thumbtack messages onto a physical bulletin
board. For instance, a user may subscribe to the misc.legal' group and post a
message debating a recent Supreme Court case. Usually within seconds,
618 [Vol. 82:609
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The Internet uses a standard method for file exchange,
enabling users on different computers to share files. It thus
opens up a wealth of data to Internet users.32 However, that
mass of data lacks value if users cannot locate the information
they desire with relative ease. Accordingly, users began to de-
velop file archives and indices to those archives, attempting to
bring some order to the dispersed information. A number of
systems eventually developed with that purpose.33 Of these,
the web is probably the most widely used and has also become
the basis for developing an Internet commercial marketplace.34
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB
Tim Berners-Lee, the web's founder, did not set out to
solve the Internet's navigational problems. Instead, Berners-
Lee simply wanted to solve a technical problem that he faced
while working as a consultant for six months at CERN, the
European physics laboratory.35 The CERN computer system
has been described as "labyrinthine"36 because data was dis-
persed over a number of machines that did not always inter-
act.37 In 1980, Berners-Lee developed a program called En-
quire that took advantage of the capabilities of hypertext 38 by
every user on the Usenet is able to read and respond to that posting.")
(footnote omitted).
32. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 4 & n.5 (noting that the ability to
move files from computer to computer was one of the goals of the ARPANET
and stating that the standard exchange means is the file transfer protocol
(fUtp)).
33. See id. 5-6 (explaining Archie, a system that periodically queried
known archives to obtain a list of available files, and Gopher, a unified inter-
face into Archie and other Internet resources).
34. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real
World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 197, 202
n.22 (1995) ("In early 1994, [the web] surpassed Gopher as the Internefs most
widely used information retrieval tool."); Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt,
The Commercial Law ofInternet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 215 (1995)
("Of the already thirty million Internet users, a minimum of fifteen million
have access to the World Wide Web.").
35. See Shahrooz Feizabadi, WWW: Beyond the Basics (last modified Jan.
9, 1997) <httpi/ei.cs.vt.edu/wwwbtb/book/chapl/web hist.html> (setting forth
the origins of the web). CERN stands for "Centre European pour la Recherche
Nucleaire." Id.
36. See Robert Wright, The Man Who Invented the Web, TIME, May 19,
1997, at 64, 66.
37. See Feizabadi, supra note 35 (noting that, at CERN, "as with other
institutions, data was stored and manipulated in isolated machines with
practically no interaction or connectivity").
38. Hypertert is a "system for linking information (usually text files) to-
1998] 619
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allowing him to link to documents on scattered CERN ma-
chines simply by clicking on a word contained in a document.39
By the time Berners-Lee returned to CERN in 1989, the
Internet had become firmly established and, in fact, in 1990,
CERN was the largest European Internet site.4° At that time,
however, the Internet "Was essentially a bare-bones infrastruc-
ture.... There were ways to retrieve data, but no really easy
ways, and certainly nothing with the intuitive, neural struc-
ture of hypertext."4 1 Berners-Lee proposed a distributed hyper-
text system to link CERN's resources, 42 and that system even-
tually evolved into the web-a hypertext system for navigating
the Internet, which derives much of its value from its ability to
link related documents. 43
gether in a structured fashion. The information can be linked based on a va-
riety of criteria, including connections based on the similarity or relatedness
of subject matter." WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 50.
39. See Feizabadi, supra note 35 (describing the development of Enquire
and noting that at that time, Berners-Lee "had only been marginally exposed
to the... concept of hypertext"); see also Wright, supra note 36, at 66
(explaining that Enquire served as Berners-Lee's "personal memory substi-
tute").
40. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 55; see also Feizabadi, supra
note 35 (noting that the Internet and its communication protocol were intro-
duced at CERN in 1984 and contending that CERN was the "largest Internet
site in Europe" by 1989).
41. Wright, supra note 36, at 66.
42. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16 at 55-56. Specifically, the objec-
tives of the project were:
[i)] to provide a common (simple) protocol for requesting human
readable information stored at a remote system, using networks [;]
[Cii)] to provide a protocol within which information can automatically
be exchanged in a format common to the supplier and the consumer [;]
[(iii)] to provide some method of reading at least text (if not graphics)
using a large proportion of the computer screens in use at CERN at
that time [;]
[iv)] to provide and maintain at least one collection of documents,
into which users may (but are not bound to) put their documents.
This collection will include much existing data... [;]
[(v)] to allow documents or collections of documents managed by in-
dividuals to be linked by hyperlinks to other documents or collections
of documents[;J
[Cvi)] to provide a keyword search option, in addition to navigation by
following references, using any new or existing indexes.... The re-
sult of a keyword search is simply a hypertext document consisting of
a list of references to nodes which match the keywords [;]
[vii)] to use public domain software wherever possible, or interface to
proprietary systems which already exist [; and]
[viii)] to provide the software for the above free of charge to anyone.
Id.
43. There are many different definitions of the web. Professor Perritt de-
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The web, as a distributed computing system, utilizes both
client and server hardware and software." In a client/server
model, a server stores information that more than one client
machine may access.45 Client and server machines vary in
size, although servers are usually larger and more powerful. 6
A small network may have one server and many clients con-
necting directly to it. The Internet, as a network of networks,
links together large numbers of both client and server ma-
chines. It makes the data residing on many servers available
to many clients. Clients may access information on the server
to which they are directly connected, as well as information
residing on all those servers to which they are indirectly con-
nected through the Internet.47
There are three main technical underpinnings to the web
that enable client-server communication. Hypertext markup
language (HTML) is the language used to write web docu-
ments, and it allows for the use of pointers-also called hyper-
links or links.48 A pointer is usually text that is highlighted in
some manner to set it apart from the rest of the document.
49
When a user clicks on a pointer, a new document or a different
part of the current document is accessed. The hypertext transfer
protocol (HTTP) is the technical standard to enable communi-
cation between clients and a server.50 This protocol helps to
scribes it as "a particularly popular applicaton for the Internet." Perritt, su-
pra note 4, at 286. Others describe the web as "a series of documents stored
in different computers all over the Internet." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Another author focuses
more on the hardware, describing the web as "a network of computers, all of
which run software conforming to Web standards." PFAFFENBERGER, supra
note 16, at 53.
44. See Perritt, supra note 4, at 286-87 & n.106 (noting that the web re-
flects "the client-server model of computer-program design").
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 287.
48. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 63 (describing HTML as af-
fording the author of a web document the ability to code the document so that
"it looks good on-screen" when accessed by a browser that understands
HTML); Perritt, supra note 4, at 287 n-108 ("Html is the protocol for tagging
certain parts of a document published on the Web so that they show up in
particular typefaces or styles, or so that they can be used as pointers to other
information objects on the same or local servers.").
49. See Perritt supra note 4, at 287.
50. See Feizabadi, supra note 35; PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 59
(describing HTrP as "a standard way by which client Web applica-
tions... establish a connection with a server, make a request for information,
receive information... from the server, and close the connection"); Perritt,
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present a seamless interface to the user as it allows different
computer systems to communicate with each other. The dis-
persed information that constitutes the Internet thus looks to the
user like a unified body of knowledge.51 The third piece of the sys-
tem is the Universal Resource Locator (URL), which is the address
of the document-the now familiar "www.name.organization"
system of domain names.5 2
Many organizations now operate web "sites" with a "home
page" containing information about the site and links to fur-
ther information deeper within the site or even located on a dif-
ferent site.53 If one thinks of a web site as a book, the home
page is like the table of contents and introduction, and the
other pages are like chapters that may be accessed by clicking
on their entry in the table of contents. 54 A party who operates
a web site is a "publisher," and the act of placing information
on a site is called "publishing."55
To a certain extent, the web suffers from the same type of
navigational problem as the Internet. Links within documents
make it easier for a user to find additional documents containing
related information. However, the user must find the initial
document containing such links before it may realize this
benefit of the web. In the first few years of the web's existence,
a user had to know the URL of the site that it wanted to access.
The user would enter the URL into its web browser, the soft-
supra note 4, at 287 n.107 (defining HTTP as the protocol that sets forth how
'Web servers exchange information with, and respond to, requests from Web
clients").
51. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aftd, 117 S.
Ct. 2329 (1997) ("Though information on the Web is contained in individual
computers, the fact that each of these computers is connected to the Internet
through [web] protocols allows all of the information to become part of a single
body of knowledge.").
52. See Wright, supra note 36 at 66 (referring to the "www.whatever" sys-
tem for addressing documents); see also PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 60
(explaining that a URL "identifies the type and location of an Internet re-
source"); Schmelzer, supra note 17, 12 & n.26 (explaining the URL and how
it translates into instructions to find the particular file).
53. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836 (describing home pages).
54. See WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 49, 54 (defining web
site as "a collection of HTML documents and related files that are owned (or
at least organized) by a particular individual or organization" and defining
home page as "(1) The default web page shown by a user's browser immedi-
ately upon startup; (2) a general term for a web site; or (3) the entry page of a
web site").
55. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 837.
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ware interface to the web that takes a specified URL and then
accesses the appropriate site. 6
One way that companies have attempted to make it easier
for users to locate them on the web is to register their trade-
mark or trade name as part of their web site address. For ex-
ample, to find information about Compaq computer's product
line, the user has only to type in the intuitive address
"www.compaq.com." Domain names associated with a company's
trademark or trade name have thus become increasingly valu-
able commodities and, in fact, may qualify for trademark pro-
tection themselves.
Search engines and web indices have also arisen to help
users find web sites of interest. Many browsers now provide
links to search engines. The search engine takes a user's query
and returns a list of web sites that the user may find interesting.
An index provides a list of links to sites that relate to the par-
ticular topic in which the user is interested. The user may
then select one or more sites to explore.
Fully automated products called spiders 8 have also
emerged to provide search services.5 9 A spider is software with
two parts. One part performs a function called "harvesting,"
allowing the spider to search the Internet for web sites and
build a database with information about such sites. 0 The second
part is the query component, which takes the user's query,
searches the database, and returns a list of sites and other in-
56. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 50 (stating that "[a] browser is
a program that runs on the computer you're using [and] lets you browse the
Internet in search of web documents," and noting that server software is also
necessary to use the web); Philip E. Ross & Nikbil Hutheesing, Along Came
the Spiders, FORBES, Oct. 23, 1995, at 210, 214 (defining web browser as
"merely a window into the Web; it doesn't have any search functions").
57. See Alan J. Hartnick, Copyright & Trademark on the Internet, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 21, 1997, at 5 (stating that domain names can qualify for trade-
marks and discussing the Trademark Office's practice, as of Feb. 12, 1996, of
registering domain names); see also infra text accompanying notes 287-292
(discussing the Panavision case on domain-name squatting).
58. See Ross & Hutheesing, supra note 56, at 210.
59. Id. at 213 (noting that Yahoo!, one of the first web indices, initially
employed human indexers to build a database for its software to search, but
that Yahoo! currently uses the electronic means of a spider).
60. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 1 11 (describing "harvesting"); see also
Ross & Hutheesing, supra note 56, at 211 ("The best spiders now at work are
capturing and indexing a million documents a day.").
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formation designed to help the user find the desired informa-
tion.61
For example, a user interested in finding out information
about summer events in Boston may enter a query in plain
English-such as "Boston summer events"--into a search engine.
The search engine will return a list of the URLs of sites that may
contain relevant information. The user may access a particular
site by clicking on its entry in the list. This helps to decrease
the user's search costs in locating information. It also helps to
make the web a viable commercial marketplace by making it
easier for potential customers to locate product information.
C. EMERGENCE OF THE INTERNET AS A COMMERCIAL
MARKETPLACE
1. Development of the Marketplace
The technical evolution of the Internet is better docu-
mented than its development into a commercial marketplace.
When the Internet was almost exclusively a research network,
access seemed free, and unrestricted use of information was
the norm. This custom was backed up by the NSF's acceptable
use policy, which restricted traffic on the network to noncom-
mercial purposes. 62
The NSF's acceptable use policy, however, applies only to
traffic on the NSFNET backbone. 63 To avoid the acceptable use
policy, a number of ISPs formed the Commercial Internet Ex-
change (CIX), a grouping of regional networks connected by a
CIX router that became functional in 1992.1 Additionally, the
61. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 12 ("For each web page matching the
user's criteria, the query component of a typical spider returns [its URL,]... a
brief summary of that page's contents, and a clickable link to that page.
Along with the list of matches, the typical spider also returns advertising.").
62. See The NSFNET Backbone Services Acceptable Use Policy (visited June
18, 1997) <http'/198.77.4.68/lynxdev/nsfnetac.html> [hereinafter NSFNET Use
Policy] ("NSFNET Backbone services are provided to support open research
and education in and among US research and instructional institutions, plus
research arms of for-profit firms when engaged in open scholarly communica-
tion and research. Use for other purposes is not acceptable."); see also Lance
Rose, NETLAW: YouR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 56 (1995) (describing how
the Internet is being commercialized and privatized).
63. See NSFNET Use Policy, supra note 62.
64. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 40 (describing how regional
ISPs joined to set up a backbone for commercial use and dating the establish-
ment of the backbone at 1991); About the Commercial Internet eXchange
(visited June 18, 1997) <hittpY/www.cixorg/C]Xlnfo/about-cix.html> (explaining
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federal government began to reduce its funding for many basic
Internet functions such that "bjy 1995, most of the traffic on
the Internet involved unsubsidized facilities and private traffic."6
The commercialization of the Internet coincided with the
development of the web and web navigational tools. The first
web software was released in 1991.66 In 1993, the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) released Mo-
saic, a user-friendly browser that the NCSA provided for free
over the Internet.' Mosaic's widespread availability and ease
of use contributed to its rapid growth, leading to at least two
noteworthy developments: (i) an increase in the number of In-
ternet users; and (ii) the growth of a private web software in-
dustry providing navigational tools.68 These developments
coupled with the low cost of establishing a web site made the
web an attractive marketplace for businesses because it enabled
them to reach a large target audience at minimal expense com-
pared to costs associated with traditional marketing channels.69
2. Web Business Models
Despite the obvious attractiveness of the web as a com-
mercial marketplace, businesses have struggled to find a way
to make money from web-based activities.70  Revenue models
the purpose of CIX and that the router has been operating since 1992). This
web page is part of the CIX web site and therefore may be more accurate as to
the actual date the router became operative.
65. PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 40 ("In 1995, [NSF] withdrew its
subsidy of the NSFNET, which was subsequently decomissioned."); see Burk,
supra note 1, 8 (stating that the NSF gradually withdrew from managing
the Internet such that "[b]y early 1995, NSF's sole duty will be to fund a few
Network Access Points ... to act as data traffic exchanges"); Perritt, supra
note 4, at 286 (noting that the withdrawal of funding by the federal govern-
ment for "basic communication and traffic management functions" resulted in
more private traffic).
66. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 57 (giving the timeline of web
development and noting that in 1991, web software was released first on
CERN machines and then on the Internet).
67. See id. at 143-44.
68. See id. at 144-45 (observing that "[t~he widespread availability of Mo-
saic on the Internet led to the web's explosive growth," and describing the
founding of Netscape by former NCSA programmers); see also id. at 57-58
(setting forth a timeline of significant events in the life of the web, which
demonstrates increasing traffic after the release of Mosaic and Netscape
Navigator).
69. See id. at 615 (noting that "there is evidence that web marketing is
more successful than marketing in other media").
70. See generally Don Clark, Facing Early Losses, Some Web Publishers
Begin to Pull the Plug, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at Al (describing some no-
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on the web may be broadly classified into three categories: (i)
advertising-based models; (ii) subscription-based models; and
(iii) "cybershopping."71
a. Advertising-Based Models
Many web publishers use advertising as their primary
source of revenue, with varying degrees of success. Under an
advertising-based revenue model, web sites generate revenue
by charging companies to advertise at their site.72 The rate
that the web site owner may charge varies depending on how
many users see the ad.73 From the advertiser's perspective, the
effectiveness of the ad is usually measured by how many
viewer's "click-through" (or link) from the web site displaying
the ad to the web site of the advertiser itself.7 4
The Internet Advertising Bureau (LAB) has estimated that
$267 million of ad revenue was generated in 1996 and $129.5
million in the first quarter of 1997 alone.75 According to the
IAB, advertisers are increasingly accepting the web as a viable
medium for marketing their products and "more and more
publishers now view advertising as the revenue model of
choice." 76  However, the pool of advertising money is limited
and historically has been distributed primarily to a few large
table failures to make money through web publishing). But see Mike Hogan,
You Can Make Money on the Web, PC WORLD, July 1, 1997, at 190 (describing
some web success stories).
71. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 13 (listing "subscriptions, advertising,
and enabling the purchase of goods and services" as examples of web revenue
models); see also Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in
Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 24-30 (1997) (describing ways in which content pro-
viders support free access and distribution of information available at their
sites by selling advertising, sponsorships, goods and services).
72. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 1 18 (noting that often users obtain free
access to web sites but see advertising along with the site's content).
73. See Catharine P. Taylor, Banner Year, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 120, 120
("Advertising is conventionally priced on an impression basis according to cost
per thousand, or CPM, meaning that marketers pay when computer users see
an advertising banner, even if they don't click through to the [advertiser's]
Web site.") CPM prices range from $120 for a widely viewed site to $6 for less
popular sites. Id.
74. See id. at 122. But see id. (suggesting that that paradigm may need to
be changed).
75. Internet Advertising Bureau Announces First QuarterAdvertising Revenue
Reporting Program Results (visited Oct. 13, 1997) <http//www.iab.net/news
/content/new%20/junel2qresults.html> [hereinafter Internet Advertising Bu-
reau Revenue Reporting].
76. Id.
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publishers. 7 This concentration may mean that only the largest
publishers trading on already established brand identities-or
trademarks-will dominate web publishing.
b. Subscription-Based Models
In contrast to advertiser-supported sites that users may
usually access for free,7 8 under a subscription-based model the
user must pay a fee to access the site.7 9 This model has met
with only limited success as users are accustomed to accessing
and using information for free on the Internet. The Wall Street
Journal's on-line paper had about 600,000 subscribers when it
was available for free.8 0 That number dropped to 50,000 after
it instituted a subscription charge.81 Microsoft recently aban-
doned plans to charge an annual fee for access to its web political
publication, stating that it recognized people's unwillingness to
pay for on-line content.8 2
c. Cybershopping
A popular use of the web is cybershopping, in which com-
panies use the web as a marketing tool. In one model of cyber-
shopping, the web site owner derives revenue from the sale of
77. In 1996, over 900 companies sought $300 million in web advertising dol-
lars with the ten largest publishers receiving two-thirds of the money. See
Clark, supra note 70, at A8. This concentration has continued in 1997. See
Internet Advertising Bureau Revenue Reporting, supra note 75 (noting that
63% of advertising revenues for the first quarter of 1997 went to the top ten
publishers but contending that this demonstrates that "advertising revenue is
being spread more evenly across the top 50 online publishers," since, in the first
quarter of 1996, the top 10 publishers accounted for 75% of advertising revenues).
78. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 18 (noting that users may not pay for
accessing or using a web site and analogizing that model to the one supporting
commercial television); see also Schlachter, supra note 71, at 25 ("The televi-
sion broadcasting model is consistent with the contention that Internet users
will not be required to pay for intellectual property, and that the production of
intellectual property can be entirely supported by advertising.").
79. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 14-15 (stating that "[ulnder the sub-
scription-based revenue model, only authorized users who have paid a subscription
fee have access to a web site's services" and also descrbing the pay-per-view model
in which users pay only for specific content).
80. See Clark, supra note 70.
81. See id.
82. See id. (quoting a web announcement by Michael Kinsley (the maga-
zine's editor): "Right now there are too many people who are too damned
cheap ... er, we mean ... too engaged by the novelty of the medium to pay
extra for content."); see also Slind-Flor, supra note 1, at Al (noting that the
Internet community resists paying for content).
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its products on-line. 83 The web thus functions as a distribution
mechanism supplementing those that the company may al-
ready have.84 Cybershopping has not yet realized its potential,
perhaps in part because of concerns about the security of credit
card and other information customers transmit with their or-
der.85  The firms that have been most successful are selling
items that are easy to ship and that may not be readily avail-
able locally.86 Some analysts suggest that web shopping will
evolve to focus primarily on digital products that can be or-
dered and shipped right over the web itself.87
Currently, the web primarily functions as another adver-
tising outlet for many firms rather than as another distribution
channel. 88 A user accesses the web site, sees product informa-
tion, and then orders the product in a conventional manner.8 9
83. See, e.g., TM Online Takes You Out to the Ball Game (visited July 23,
1997) <http'//www.ticketmaster.com/jackpot/baseball/> (providing schedules
of major league teams and allowing visitors to order tickets online); Welcome
to Lands' End (visited June 20, 1997) <www.landsend.com> (allowing visitors
to the site to order products from Lands End, a direct-mail company).
84. Some companies sell only over the web. See Hogan, supra note 70, at
190-91 (describing the success of amazon.com, a cyberbookstore).
85. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 616 (stating that "[o]n-line
shopping hasn't arrived-yet" and noting that it is unclear whether the reason
for the failure of on-line shopping to reach its potential is a lack of security or
some other factor); Lori Hawkins, Commerce on Internet to Rise in '96, Fore-
cast Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 11, 1996, at C1 (predicting that elec-
tronic commerce would increase in 1996 and quoting Nick Miller of Price Wa-
terhouse: "Commercial exploitation of the Internet has been stalled because of
security issues.... As security systems emerge and consumers become more
confident, ordering a sweater from Eddie Bauer or software from Egghead will
be a real possibility for people."); see also Jon G. Auerbach, Software Devel-
oper to Unveil Coupons for Use on Internet, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1997, at B13
(noting that direct Internet sales "were a relatively small $530 million in
1996"). For discussions of the security concerns of transacting over the Inter-
net, see, for example, Michael Froomkin, Trusted Third Parties in Electronic
Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996) (discussing how communications may be
attacked and how web transactors will need a means by which to authenticate
the identity of the person with whom they're interacting); Rustad &
Eisenschmidt, supra note 34 (discussing a wide range of security issues on the
Internet).
86. PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 616.
87. See Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, The Buck Starts Here, WIRED, Aug. 1996,
at 133, 135 (discussing the marketing of digital products over the Internet).
88. See Schmelzer, supra note 17, 19 (noting that a site may be an ad-
vertisement); Auerbach, supra note 85, at B13 (stating that there is a "much
larger market of sales promoted by the [Internet]" than there is a market for
direct sales) (emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 70, at 192-94 (explaining the
www.allonetribedrum.com site, which offers Native American drums for sale);
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The cost of advertising on the web is relatively low compared to
other media, and it can be quite effective for certain advertis-
ers.90 Many firms combine both product information and the
ability to order on-line or conventionally to maximize consumer
choice.91
d. Emerging Web Revenue Models
New web revenue models are emerging almost daily. For
example, Microsoft is planning sites that will link users to
other commercial sites for a variety of services including travel
bookings and automobile sales.92 Microsoft intends to support
these services through advertising and transaction fees.93
"AMicrosoft hopes to get a 'vig,' or vigorish, on every transaction
over the Internet that uses Microsoft's technology."94 For ex-
ample, Microsoft operates a Carpoint site to help users pur-
chase automobiles. 95 Auto-By-Tel pays Microsoft a fee for Mi-
crosofts directing Carpoint users to Auto-By-Tel's network of
dealers. 96 Auto-By-Tel in turn makes money by charging the
dealers in its network a monthly membership fee.97 Microsoft's
All One Tribe Drum (visited June 20, 1997) <http.I/www.allonetribe.com/#order>
(giving information on how to order a drum by phone or e-mail and giving a
fax number but not providing for direct ordering from the web site); Sears:
Products & Services (visited July 23, 1997) <http'/www.sears.com/prod/fprod.
htm> (showing sales items as they appear in the printed circular).
90. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 615 (asserting that costs of
advertising on the web are small in comparison to traditional media and relat-
ing anecdotes of web success stories); Schlachter, supra note 71, at 25 ("[T]he
results obtainable from on-line advertising can be so compelling that certain
advertisers have strong incentives to choose Internet advertising over other
media.").
91 For an example of a site that allows the user to order on-line and also
allows the user to click on "other ways to order by phone, fax, or mail," see
Our Internet Store (visited June 20,1997) <httpi/www.landsend.com>.
92. See David Bank, Microsoft Moves to Rule On-Line Sales, WALL ST. J.,
'June 5, 1997, at B1 (explaining how Microsoft is setting up "Sidewalk" sites
for many cities to serve as entry ports to an "array of [Microsoft] commercial
sites that already includes Expedia for travel services, Carpoint for automo-
bile sales, Cinemania for movies and Music Central for compact disks").
93. See d. (noting that Microsoft plans to make money from advertising
and also through sales and distribution charges).
9{ Id. "Vigorish is a slang term used by bookmakers that means,
roughly, the profit made for bringing bettors together." Id.
95. See supra note 92 (describing the commercial services Microsoft al-
ready offers).
96. See Bank, supra note 92, at B1 (noting that Auto-By-Tel pays Micro-
soft for referrals, but not explaining how the payment system is set up).
97. See id. (noting that Auto-By-Tel charges its membership monthly fees
ranging from $500 to $1500).
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ultimate goal is to eliminate middlemen like Auto-By-Tel and,
instead, to function as the gateway that connects users to the
appropriate supplier, with suppliers paying Microsoft for di-
recting business to them-a new commission-based revenue
model.98
None of the web revenue models has yet proven to be a re-
sounding success. However, the advertising-based model cur-
rently dominates and that model, along with the commission-
based model, depends heavily on information about how many
users are linking to a particular site. Such information helps
to set advertising rates and commission fees. Recent events
have demonstrated that, depending on the business model they
have adopted, web site owners may want to control who links
to their sites. The legal issue then is one of defining what the
law with respect to linking should be: Should the default rule
be one that requires a linker to seek permission before linking
to another page or should it be one that allows linking without
permission?
II. NAVIGATING THE NET THROUGH LINKING-THE
TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND THE LEGAL CHALLENGES
The power of the web lies in its ability to link related
documents. A particular web site's value is largely determined
by how many people access it-the cyberspace equivalent of
"foot traffic."99 Generally, there are two ways for users to ac-
cess web sites: directly by typing in the site's URL or indirectly
by linking from another site or search engine.' 0 Until recently,
the practice of linking was largely welcomed by web site own-
ers.' The more parties that access a site, whether directly or
98. See id. (discussing Microsofts ability to undercut competitors and
explaining that Auto-By-Tel has decided to end the partnership because Mi-
crosoft is setting up its own dealer network). An on-line stock brokerage
service currently pays Microsoft to direct customers to it with the brokerage
firm charging investors a fee on each trade. See id. The president of the bro-
kerage service assumes that Microsoft will eventually want to collect those
fees: "[Microsoft] learn[s], assimilate[s], copfies] .... Once [it] get[s] done with
all the other blips on the radar screen, you become the blip." Id.
99. Cf. Kenneth Freeling & Joseph E. Levi, Frame Liability Clouds the
Internet's Future, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 1997, at S5 (noting that links can in-
crease web site traffic).
100. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Dangerous Liaisons: The Legal
Risks of Linking Web Sites, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1997, at 3 (describing the basic
structure of web sites and hypertext links).
10L See, e.g., Paul Andrews, Competition on the Web Just the Ticket for
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indirectly, the higher the advertising rate the web site's owner
may charge and the more revenue the web site's owner may
generate from sales of its own products available at the site.
0 2
Also, until recently, there was not much question that access to
a site by linking was impliedly authorized by the owner's
placement of material on the web without restriction.
Two recently filed cases have questioned the validity of
linking under both copyright and trademark law. In Ticket-
master Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., °3 Ticketmaster sued Microsoft
for trademark dilution and unfair competition under the Lan-
ham Act1°4 for Microsoft's linking to parts of the Ticketmaster
web site without Ticketmaster's permission."5 In Washington
Post Co. v. Total News, Inc.,6 the Washington Post and other
news agencies sued Total News for common law misappropria-
tion, copyright and trademark infringement, and trademark
dilution for the manner in which Total News linked to their
sites. 07
A brief review of these cases supports the contention that
copyright law will become less important as firms turn to both
federal actions under the Lanham Act and common law misap-
propriation claims in attempting to regulate linking conduct.
To understand why this is the case, however, first requires an
acquaintance with the technical aspects of linking.
A. TYPES OF LINKING
The most basic type of link, and the subject of the Ticket-
master case, is the Hypertext Reference Link (HREF). 08 An
HREF link is usually a bit of text within a web document that
is highlighted or otherwise set off from the rest of the text.0 9
Lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES, May 4, 1997, at C1 (noting the common assumption
that linking is "beneficial to all parties involved"); Alan J. Hartnick,
'Framing": Internet Equivalent of Pirating?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1997, at 5
(noting that the general view has been that providers are happy if others
point to their sites since links increase site traffic).
102. See Freeling & Levi, supra note 99 ("For sites that hope to generate
advertising revenues, the more visitors, the greater the potential payoff.").
103. No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal. filed May 9, 1997).
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1996).
105. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP,(C.D.
Cal. filed May 9, 1997).
106. No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
107. Id.
108. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 100 (calling HREF links "the most
fundamental hyperlinks").
109. See Id (listing coloring or formatting like underlining as ways to set off an
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
When a user clicks on the HREF link (or pointer), the computer
stops displaying what is currently on-screen, connects to the
linked site, and displays the content at that site."0 Techni-
cally, when the user clicks on the pointer, the user's machine
sends a request to the server on which the document to be
linked resides-the copyright owner's server."' That machine
then sends a copy of the document to the user's machine where
it will be displayed on the screen for the user to browse and
perhaps download.' 2  The original remains on the copyright
owner's server.
A pointer may link to another location on the same page, a
different page within the same site, or to a different site remote
from the linking site." 3 The web's organization is thus recur-
sive, as a particular web page may contain links to a number of
other web pages that in turn contain links to other web pages
(or back to the original linking page), and so on.114 HREF links
are "one-at-a-time" links in that the user accesses only one site
at a time. When the user leaves the current site by linking to
another one, the content of the linked site and its URL replace
the content and URL of the linking site on the user's screen.
A second type of link,"' and the subject of the Total News
case, is the "frame." Frames function much like the windows
HREF link from the rest of the web page's text); Daniel A. Tysver, Internet Law:
Linking (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http//www.bitlaw.com/Internetdlinking.html>
(noting that links may appear in different forms such as graphic icons or
prominent text).
110. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 100, at 3 ("When a hypertext link
is activated, the browsing computer establishes a new connection with the
new linked site."); Tysver, supra note 109 ("[An HREF link ... instructs a
browser to stop viewing content transmitted from one location, and begin
viewing that of another.").
111. See Rebecca Quick, How a Link Works, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at B6
("The browser reads the code [representing the site address], goes out to the
Internet and tracks down the Web page that matches the address, and makes
a request for a copy of that Web page. The computer running the linked Web
page sends the copy back to the user's browser, and the browser reads the
code and assembles the page on the user's computer screen.").
112. See id.
113. See Tysver, supra note 109 (describing the way links work).
114 See WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 1 (pointing out that
"[m]any web sites are little more than aggregated links to other sites");
Schmelzer, supra note 17, 11.
115. A third type of link is the inline link or an Image (1MG) link. An IMG
link allows a web site to insert images from another web site. See Raysman &
Brown, supra note 100 (noting that IMGs are really HTML codes that insert
images into HTML documents and defining inlined images as "graphics that
are visible onscreen as part of a web document's main body (as opposed to
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that have become familiar to the many users of the Macintosh
and Windows operating systems. A site that utilizes framing
has the ability to bring up the entire contents or portions of one
or more other sites that are 'framed" within the linking site.
116
The user remains at the framing site, looking through windows
into one or more linked sites.117 Since framing divides the
screen, usually only portions of the framed sites may be seen at
any one time, although the user may scroll through the linked
site to get a fuller picture of it."' Technically, framing is
achieved by using certain HTML code in the linking document
coupled with enabling code contained in the user's browser
software.119 The linked document is accessed in much the same
way as with an HREF link. The user's machine sends a re-
quest for the document to be linked to the document owner's
server, which makes a copy and sends it back to the user's ma-
chine. The contents of the linked site are not altered but their
appearance is. The linking site's programming code directs the
within a separate window), but which originate at a different source than the
document~s HTML code"). For example, a web site on baseball might insert an
image of Charlie Brown playing the game. This image may originate on an
entirely different site, but the IMG link allows it to be incorporated on the
linking page. An image may be incorporated from the same web page or site
or from an entirely different web site. See id. at 3 ("The inlined images them-
selves may originate locally in files stored on a documenes host server or at
any point on the Internet-including web sites owned or maintained by par-
ties unrelated to the site iing the image."). Since the URL displayed on
the screen continues to be the URL of the lindng site, the user may never
realize that the image originated elsewhere. See Tysver, supra note 109.
Because IMG links are roughly similar to frames and the Total News case
concentrates on framing, this Article does not separately address IMG links;
the framing analysis is readily adaptable to deal with IMG links. In fact, IMG
links may be more troublesome than frames under a trademark analysis. In
the case of a frame, the user clicks on a link that activates the frame. In con-
trast, IMG links happen automatically-without any user intervention. Thus,
it is more likely that the user knows the real source of the linked image in the
case of a frame than an IMG link
116. See Matt Jackson, Linking Copyright To Homepages, 49 FED. COMM.
L.J. 731, 739 (1997) ("A frame allows the author of A to create a 'window'
within her page so that when a user follows a link to B, B appears within the
window.").
117. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 100, at 3 (stating that frames "allow
viewers to look 'through' a site to another, without ever terminating the con-
nection to the linking site").
118. See Jackson, supra note 116, at 739 (elaborating on the functioning of
frames).
119. See generally Greg R. Notess, Negotiating Netscape's Frames, ONLINE,
Sept. 19, 1996, at 65 (describing programming using the frame feature).
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web browser to display the content in a frame rather than full-
screen.
There are some notable differences between HREF links
and frames. HREF links end the connection to the linking site
and display the URL and entire contents of the new, linked
site. In contrast, frames display the URL of the linking site
and may incorporate only selected contents of the linked site.
It is generally obvious to users that they have changed sites
when they access an HREF link while it may not be at all obvi-
ous that information has been incorporated from other sites
when a frame is activated. The Ticketmaster and Total News
cases provide an ideal means to highlight these differences and
assess their legal relevance because each case primarily in-
volves a different type of link.
B. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO LINKING
1. The Ticketmaster v. Microsoft Case: The HREF Link
The first American case12° to base its claim on a challenge
to an HREF link was filed in the spring of 1997 by Ticketmas-
ter Corp. against Microsoft Corp.12' Microsoft had recently be-
gun a strategy of setting up advertiser-supported web sites as
120. The first case to involve an HREF link was filed in Scotland. See
Jackson, supra note 116, at 733-34 n.7 (describing the Shetland Times suit
against the Shetland News for linking to its site). The Shetland News
"reproduced verbatim a number of headlines appearing in The Shetland
Times. These headlines were hyperlinked to the [Times] Web site. Clicking
on the headline took the reader directly to the internal pages on the [Times]
site on which the related story was found." Martin H. Samson, Hyperlink at
Your Own Risk, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1997, at 1. The court issued an "interim
interdict" pending further litigation. Id. The case, however, is of limited use-
fuilness as it primarily turns on English law. But see Jackson, supra note 116(noting that, although the case turns on the specifics of English law, it points
out that "the concern over links is becoming an increasingly important issue
worldwide"). In the United States, the first case to include a claim based on
an HREF link was Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1990
(PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997). That case, however, focused primarily on
framing. See infra Part H.B.2.
121. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal.
filed May 9, 1997). Note that this filing refers to the "First Amended Com-
plaint." An earlier complaint was filed in April. See Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 30, 1997). This Article re-
fers to the First Amended Complaint, to which Microsoft has filed an answer.
See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV97-3055 RAP (ANx) (C.D.
Cal. filed May 29, 1997)
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city guides.12 For example, its "http://seattle.sidewalk.com"
site, the subject of the litigation, contains information on that
city, including guides to entertainment and restaurants as well
as a menu setting forth events around Seattle, many of which
require tickets for admission.123 These tickets were often avail-
able from Ticketmaster at its web site.124 The companies had ne-
gotiated for a mutually beneficial marketing deal involving
linking their respective sites.125 However, no agreement was ever
reached. 126 Despite the lack of agreement, Microsoft included a
number of links to the Ticketmaster site from Sidewalk 127 After
the agreement with Microsoft failed to materialize, Ticketmas-
ter entered into a licensing agreement with CitySearch, a com-
petitor of Microsof's.
128
122. See Ticketmaster, No. CV97-3055 DDP 15 (noting that online publi-
cation of city guides is "a featured offering by Microsoft" and describing Mi-
crosofls plans to publish city guides for a number of cities).
123. See Seth Schiesel, In Ticketmaster v. Microsoft It's Tough to Know
Whom to Root For, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at D4 ("[Microsoft offers a] free
menu of leisure time information-what bands are playing, what teams are in
town, what the symphony will be performing. Attending many of those events
requires tickets.").
124. See id.
125. See id. (stating that estimates range from a 45-day to one-year nego-
tiation); Ticketmaster Suit Targets Microsoft, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 30,
1997, Bus., at 1 (stating that Microsoft contends it negotiated with Ticketmas-
ter for four to five months "seeking to promote each other's sites and jointly
sponsor events").
126. See Schleisel, supra note 123 (noting that the negotiations broke down
because the two sides could not reach mutually acceptable terms); see also
Ticketmaster, No. CV97-3055 DDP 1 16 ("Negotiations for an agreement with
Microsoft allowing Microsoft to profit from linkage to and association with
Ticketmaster's... web site have failed.").
127. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP 16
(alleging that after negotiations failed Microsoft made use of links to Ticket-
master anyway).
128. See id. 13
Based on the value of its proprietary content, Ticketmaster Multi-
media (a division of Ticketmaster) recently entered into a marketing
alliance with CitySearch, Inc. Under the terms of the agreement, Ci-
tySearch is providing cash and trade value for precisely the same
Ticketmaster web site content that Microsoft has filtered.
Ticketmaster Suit Targets Microsoft, supra note 125 (stating that Ticketmas-
ter will "provide online ticketing and event information" in its deal with Ci-
tySearch). More recently, Ticketmaster has entered into an agreement with
Excite Inc., to "split advertising revenues generated when consumers are fun-
neled from Excite's Web site to Ticketmaster." Ticketmaster and Excite In
Pact for Internet Sales, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1997, at B8.
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Ticketmaster's complaint itself was quite brief, alleging six
claims for relief.129  Interestingly, the complaint was based
primarily on trademark claims, making no mention of copy-
right infringement.13 ° The complaint alleged that, by using
Ticketmaster's trademarks and trade names on its web site,
Microsoft was free-riding on Ticketmaster's name and marks
and enhancing the value of its seattle.sidewalk.com site at the
expense of Ticketmaster's site.131
Ticketmaster seemed to object primarily to three Microsoft
practices. First, Microsoft linked deeply within Ticketmaster's
site rather than to the home page. Ticketmaster alleged that
this practice took Ticketmaster's content out of context and di-
verted advertising dollars from Ticketmaster to Microsoft.1 32
Second, in a related complaint, Ticketmaster claimed that the
use of the Ticketmaster trademark and trade names generally
on Microsoft's site allowed Microsoft to attract advertising
dollars: "Microsoft has used Ticketmaster's property and
goodwill to sell advertising on its own web site, thereby, in ef-
fect, rewriting the rules of commerce for it's [sic] own benefit."133
According to Ticketmaster, "absent an agreement with the
129. See Ticketmaster, No. CV97-3055 DDP 9 24-37 (alleging causes of
action for trademark dilution, unfair competition under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, state law unfair competition, misleading statements, common
law unfair competition and unfair business practices; and asking for declara-
tory relief).
130. See id. IT 24-27 (setting forth trademark counts).
131. See id. 19 ("Microsoft's commercial use and appropriation of Tick-
etmaster's name, marks and web site ... has enhanced the value of Micro-
soft's web site and business and diluted and diminished the value of Ticket-
master's web site and business."). "By creating advertiser supported pages on
its web site consisting solely of Ticketmaster's live event information and
services without Ticketmaster's approval, and by prominently offering it as a
service to their users, Microsoft is feathering its own nest at Ticketmaster's
expense. It is, in effect, committing electronic piracy." Id. 17.
132. See Brett Atwood, Ticketmaster, Microsoft In Legal Battle-Lawsuit
Concerns Links Between Web Sites, BILLBOARD, May 10, 1997 (citing Alan Cit-
ron, Ticketmasters senior Vice President of Multimedia: "It's one thing if they
simply link to our home page, which more than 5,000 sites have done.... But
they are bypassing our home page and taking our content out of context,
which we are not comfortable with.... Microsoft is financially benefiting
from ad sales on its site that accompany our content."); Ticketmaster Suit Targets
Microsoft, supra note 125 ("By creating a link directly to Ticketmaster's
ticket-buying pages, Microsoft is diverting customers from the vendor's Web
pages that contain advertising content, Ticketmaster President and Chief Ex-
ecutive Frederic Rosen said. 'Why should they get the benefit of advertising
(in Seattle Sidewalk) when the money is mine?' Rosen said.").
133. Ticketmaster, No. CV97-3055 DDP 1 18.
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owner for use of a web site, web sites are for personal noncom-
mercial use."13 4 Finally, Ticketmaster had agreed with Master-
Card to give that credit card prominence in its advertising.
135
The complaint alleged that "Microsoft's use of Ticketmaster's
name in connection with MasterCard, which use does not give
MasterCard prominence, dilutes the value of that relationship."
136
2. The Washington Post v. Total News Case: The "Frame"
The first case 137 to challenge the practice of framing was
filed in February, 1997, by a group of plaintiffs operating on-
line news sites. 138 The plaintiffs, led by The Washington Post,
sued Total News and others for the operation of a web site that
used the plaintiffs' trademarks as pointers and framed the
plaintiffs' sites when a user accessed them.139
The Total News site is essentially a collection of links, "a
one-stop emporium for the news junkie, provid[ing] access to
nearly 1,200 media company sites.""4 When the user accesses
a link, the contents of the linked site appear in a window, or
"frame," surrounded by the contents, including the advertising,
of the Total News site. As is characteristic of framing, the To-
tal News URL rather than the URL of the linked site continues
to be displayed.
The plaintiffs sued under a number of theories, including
copyright and trademark infringement and trademark dilution.
The heart of the complaint, however, sounded in misappro-
priation. The primary basis of the plaintiffs' objection to the
defendants' conduct was that Total News was free-riding on
134. Id.
135. See id. 21.
136. Id.
137. In May, Playboy filed suit against Web2l for Web2l's framing of
Playboy's content. See MA. Stapleton, Playboy Settles Internet 'Framing'
Trademark Case, CI. DAILY L. BULL., May 21, 1997, at 1. The suit was set-
tled on the same day the defendant was served. See id.
138. See Copyright, Trademarks Allegedly Infringed by Service That
Frames Content of Others, 2 Electronic Info. Pol'y & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at
262 (Feb. 28, 1997) (summarizing allegations and listing the plaintiffs: "The
Washington Post Co., Digital Ink Co., Time Inc., Entertainment Weekly, Inc.,
Cable News Network, Inc.... Los Angeles Times, Dow Jones & Co., and
Reuters America, Inc.").
139. See id. (listing as defendants "Total News, Inc., Datapix, Inc., Grouper
Technologies, Inc., Roman Godzich, Larry Pagni, and Norman Bashkingy").
140. Matthew Fleischer, Washington Post v. Total News, AM. LAW., Apr.,
1997, at 87.
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the plaintiffs' newsgathering efforts because it sold advertising
based on the plaintiffs' content rather than its own:
Defendants provide little or no content of their own. Instead Defen-
dants have designed a parasitic website that republishes the news
and editorial content of others' websites in order to attract both ad-
vertisers and users. Specifically, Defendants' website is designed to
feature the content of Plaintiffs' and others' websites, inserted within
a "frame" on the computer screen that includes Defendants' total-
news.com logo and URL as well as advertising that Defendants have
sold.... Simply put, Defendants are engaged in the Internet
equivalent of pirating copyrighted material from a variety of famous
newspapers, magazines, or television news programs; packaging
those stories to advertisers as part of a competitive publication or
program produced by Defendants' and pocketing the advertising
revenue generated by their unauthorized use of that material.1
4
'
Based on the complaint, the news organizations seemed to
object primarily to Total News framing their sites with adver-
tising that Total News had sold. Additionally, the plaintiffs
also objected to Total News's use of their logos as the BREF
linking symbol."
The parties settled the litigation in June, 1997.141 Under
the settlement, Total News agreed to stop framing the plain-
tiffs' sites.'" Total News is allowed to employ HREF links to
the plaintiffs' sites, using "the names of the linked sites in
plain text which may be highlighted" but not using the
"Plaintiffs proprietary logos." 45 Any plaintiff may revoke its
permission to link on 15 days' notice but, interestingly,
[i]f Defendant refuse [sic] to cease linking upon notice, and any
Plaintiff brings an action to enforce its rights under this subpara-
graph, it shall be an affirmative defense that Defendants' conduct
141. Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) 8,
10 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
142. See id. 57 (alleging that defendants' use of plaintiffs' trademarks
"caused consumers mistakenly to believe that some or all of the Defendants
have an affiliation with Plaintiffs").
143. See Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL)
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1997) (stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal);
Parties Settle Total News "Framing" Suit; Framing Halted, Hyperlinks Will be
Text-Only, 2 Electronic Pol'y & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 612-13 (June 13,
1997) (summarizing litigation and settlement agreement).
144. See Total News, No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997)
3 ("[I1n particular, Defendants agree permanently to cease the practice of
"framing" Plaintiffs' websites as that practice is described in the complaint in
this case.").
145. Id. 4(a)-(b).
638 [Vol. 82:609
FENCING CYBERSPACE
does not otherwise infringe or violate Plaintiffs rights under any4the-
ory of any intellectual property, unfair competition or other law." 4
While it is speculative to divine from a settlement what the
parties thought the outcome at trial would be, one could infer
that, at least, Total News believes that HREF links are allow-
able even without permission of the linked site.
3. Discerning Litigation Trends
Admittedly, two cases, one undecided and the other set-
tled, make a small sample from which to draw inferences about
how the law will evolve on-line. However, when those cases
are considered against the backdrop of on-line revenue models,
one may identify some trends with reasonable certainty.
For example, to a certain extent both cases are a product of
building the web revenue model around advertising. Ticket-
master objected to Microsoft's bypassing its home page contain-
ing banner ads, while the plaintiffs in Total News objected to
Total News obscuring their advertising and framing their sites
with ads from which Total News profited. As the competition
for advertising dollars stiffens, more and more companies are
likely to seek legal redress when they can make a tenable claim
that other sites are diverting advertising dollars away from
them.
Second, the lack of emphasis on copyright is notable. Tick-
etmaster made no copyright claim while the copyright claim
appeared almost as an afterthought in the Total News case, as
count eight of a nine count complaint. Employing conclusory
language, the plaintiffs asserted, "Defendants' conduct violates
several of the exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 belonging
to the Plaintiffs as owners of the copyrights in their respective
content and websites."147
Third, the gravamen of both complaints was really unfair
competition, although stated in different causes of action. Both
cases alleged federal trademark dilution and violations of sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act for a false implication of associa-
tion between the plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiffs in
Total News also claimed trademark infringement for the use of
their trademarks and trade names as pointers on the Total
News site and stated a common law misappropriation claim.
Disputes over trademarks are likely only to increase because
146. Id. I 4(b).
147. Id 72.
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establishing a brand identity is one way to attract users to
one's site and thereby generate more advertising dollars.
The task for the law in assessing these claims is to weigh
competing policies to determine when intellectual property
rights should be implicated on the Internet. Once intellectual
property rights are sorted out at the federal level, the analysis
may turn to state causes of action to define how they may
supplement or alter federal rights.
Il. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS-DEBATING THE
APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULE FOR LINKING
The issue in both the Ticketmaster and Total News cases is
one of defining what constitutes permissible linking conduct in
the absence of an agreement with the linked site. One way to
approach this question is to consider the policy issues that
linking implicates to assist in formulating the appropriate le-
gal rule.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR A STRONG PROPERTY RIGHTs REGIME IN
CYBERSPACE
The very term web "site" brings to mind the idea of prop-
erty. And the term "property" in turn introduces notions of
excludability, whether phrased in terms of trespass to physical
property or infringement of intangible property protected by an
intellectual property right. If a web site is considered property,
the question arises as to the scope of the owner's right to ex-
clude others from accessing it by linking. In the language of
entitlements, the question is whether a linking site has an en-
titlement to include an HREF link and/or frame or whether the
web site owner has an entitlement to stop linking conducted
without its permission.
The classical framework set forth by Professor Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed contends that property rules are most
appropriate when transaction costs of bargaining are low.148 A
number of commentators have argued that transaction costs in
cyberspace are likely to be low relative to those of conventional
media.149 In fact, in any one linking transaction, only two par-
148. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089,
1118 (1972).
149. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 3, at 236-27 (noting that transaction costs
are generally lower in cyberspace because of lower costs of communication and
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ties are usually involved-the web site owners of the respective
sites. However, a popular site may process many such trans-
actions. For example, over 5,000 sites link to the Ticketmaster
home page.5 0 This suggests that transaction costs, at least for
processing requests for permission to establish an HREF link,
are likely to be quite high in the aggregate for popular desti-
nation sites.
Fortunately, the debate about whether and to what extent
a linker or web site owner should be entitled to property rights
can be informed by reference to practices that have already
evolved on the Internet as well as technological and other legal
considerations. Thus, the theory of Calabresi and Melamed
can be informed by how "law" has evolved over the Internet,
helping to form a legal rule for linking.
B. CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW-NETIQUETTE
When the Internet was still primarily a research network
and even as it evolved into a medium of communication for a
wide range of users via e-mail and newsgroups, disputes were
mostly resolved outside of the judicial system by reference to
the customs of the Internet. Netiquette is the set of informal
norms that have largely governed the conduct of Internet
communication.151 Netiquette is, quite'simply, the custom of
the Internet. Custom often serves as a source of law and, at
least in some areas, commentators have suggested that it is
desirable for the law to reflect what people actually do in prac-
tice.15 Thus, an understanding of netiquette helps to assess
the desirability of selecting a particular set of rules.
the lower cost of "computer recording of transaction data"); Perritt, supra note
4, at 276 (noting that technology may impose small transaction costs on con-
sumers and content originators but impose high transaction costs on free-
riders); Schlachter, supra note 71, at 22 (1997) ("[Wlbile transaction costs are
not zero, the Internet has significantly reduced transaction costs."); see also
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116(1997) (noting that only certain types of transaction costs are lowered in cy-
berspace).
150. See Atwood, supra note 132 (quoting Ticketmaster's senior Vice
President of Multimedia as saying, "It's one thing if they simply link to our
home page, which more than 5,000 sites have done," leading to the inference
that Ticketmaster would not have complained if Microsoft linked to its home
page without permission, as well as the inference that at least some of the
over 5,000 linkers do not have permission).
151 See Slind-Flor, supra note 1 (calling netiquette "the social-contract
etiquette of the Internet").
152. For example, Article 2 ("Sales") of the Uniform Commercial Code
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The netiquette of linking suggests that it is permissible to
use an HREF link to connect to a site without first seeking
permission, although it is polite to send an e-mail to the web
site's owner informing it of the newly established link. 53 There
are two reasons for this general rule. First, as noted above, the
sheer volume of e-mail requests for permission may be quite
onerous."' The more popular the site, the greater the costs of
processing linking permission requests.
The second reason for the norm is rooted in the openness
of the Internet and the purpose of the web. The Internet's
openness is one of its distinguishing characteristics, while the
web was purposely designed to enable links. 55 Historically,
web publishers have designed sites knowing that others may
link to them and that the norm of the Internet is information
sharing. In fact, web site authors have chosen to publish on
the web to exploit just these features of the Internet. Thus, the
largely reflects its drafters' beliefs that law is revealed by the practices of con-
cerned parties. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 302-40 (1973); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 626 (1975) ("Article II
frequently speaks as though courts should discover the law merchant from a
careful, disinterested examination of custom and fact situations.").
153. See Arlene Rinaldi, The Net: User Guidelines and Netiquette (last
modified Oct. 4, 1996) <http'//www.fau.edu/rinaldi/net/web.html> ("It is not a
requirement to ask permission to link to another's site, though out of respect
for the individual and their efforts, a simple e-mail message stating that you
have made a link to their site would be appropriate."); see also, WEB LINKING
AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that while there is no consensus on
whether permission to link is required, the assumption that no permission is
required is "broadly held"); Jonathan Rosenoer, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE
INTERNET 10 (1996) ("[B]ecause the World Wide Web is, in essence, a protocol
that exists only to link sites to each other, it is hard to see how anyone could
claim the right to restrict site access only to those receiving specific permis-
sion to do so."); Dan Goodin, Aiming at the Heart of the Web, RECORDER, Apr.
30, 1997, at 1 ("Sites rarely ask for permission to link to another site.");
Hartnick, supra note 101 (stating that as a matter of "common usage" no
permission is required to link to another site). But see Web Issues (last visited
October 18, 1997) <http'//www.benedict.com/webiss.htm#can> ("Netiquette
dictates that: Other Websites be told when you plan to link to them."); Guide-
line for the House of Representative's Staff (last visited Aug. 1, 1997)
<gopher/gopher~huse-go.70/OF-1/3a208O3abatereto20Etiquette> ("Don't point
to other sites without asking first.").
154. See Rinaldi, supra note 153, at <http//www.fau.edu/rinaldil
net/permission.txt> (stating that as the author of her own web page to which
thousands of others link, she would not want to manage e-mail from thou-
sands of sites asking for permission to link); see also supra note 150 and ac-
companying text (noting that over 5,000 sites link to Ticketmaster).
155. See supra Parts HA and H.B (discussing the purposes of the Internet
and web).
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Internet community has widely held the view that, by choosing
to post a web site, the web publisher opts in to a system in
which other documents may link to its site. It may opt out of
that system by restricting access to its site through technologi-
cal means.15 6
There is, however, some dissent within the Internet com-
munity as to the appropriate netiquette for HREF linking.
This dissent focuses on the fact that a link may generate an as-
sociation between the two sites that the linked site finds objec-
tionable. 5 7  One of the most widely cited examples of this
"unwanted association" effect is the "Babes on the Web" con-
troversy. 58 Babes on the Web was a web site consisting of
links to the home pages of certain women whose sites included
their photographs. 5 9 The links were accompanied by a desir-
ability rating. 61 When a number of women objected to their
inclusion on the Babes on the Web site, the site's operator
eventually removed the links to the objecting sites.' 6' It is ex-
actly such unwanted associational effects that have led some to
suggest that netiquette requires a grant of permission before
linking or, minimally, removal of the offending link upon ob-
jection by the linked site. 62
In fact, linking agreements are common, at least among
businesses,16 and are likely only to increase.164 While it is not
156. See supra note 153 (citing Rosenoer on the inconsistency of requiring
permission to link to a web document); Raysman & Brown, supra note 100, at
3 ("As a general rule, materials published on the Web may be viewed by the
general pool of all Internet users unless affirmative steps are taken to limit
access."); see also infra Part HI.0 (delineating technological means by which a
web publisher may restrict website access).
157. See Web Issues, supra note 153 (noting that the goodwill attached to a
web site may be diminished by an association with an undesirable linking
site).
158. See id. (describing the operation of the website).
159. See Dwight Silverman, Battling Over Babes in Cyberland, HOUSTON
CHON., July 9, 1995, Bus., at 6 (describing the site and the Babes on the Web
H site, which contains pointers to sites with photos of men).
160. See id. (stating that women were ranked on a scale from "Babe-O-
Rana" to "Babe-O-Matie").
16L See id. (noting that, while initially the site operator refused to remove
links on objection, he now does so).
162. See supra note 153 (citing authorities arguing that permission to link
is required).
163. See Rebecca Quick, "Can't Get There From Here" May Be Web's New
Motto, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at B6 (noting that linking agreements are be-
ginning to proliferate); Raysman & Brown, supra note 100, at 3 ("[Llinking
agreements are common between the publishers of the Web sites who have a
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clear that any agreement is legally required for an UREF link,
businesses often use linking agreements to establish comple-
mentary business and marketing relationships, provide for re-
ciprocal links, establish performance requirements, and clarify
liability issues. 65 Simply stated, the ability to link has value,
but in the wide-open world of the Internet, it has been difficult
to appropriate that value, "creat[ing] problems for commercial
Web sites that want to use their content as an asset when
striking deals with other sites."'66 The historical view has been
that linking is usually a symbiotic relationship. The ability of
the linking site to link increases its value, and the linked site
derives a benefit from the extra traffic generated by linking.
67
The netiquette for linking to the interior of a site is not as
established as that for linking to the home page. Web site
owners may object to such linking primarily for two reasons. If
the site owner rearranges the site's structure, older links may
malfunction and users may blame the linked site's owner, ad-
versely affecting its reputation. Others, like Ticketmaster, ob-
ject because linking within the site bypasses the site owner's
"logo- and ad-encrusted home pages," where advertising rates
may be based on the number of hits to that home page.168
common business interest").
164. The ABA has recently published a book identifying issues involved in
web linking agreements and including sample contractual terms. See WEB
LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 3. The ABA acknowledges that permission
may not be required for linking with an HREF link but that a "web-link
agreement that clearly sets forth the terms of the link is increasingly valu-
able" as intellectual property rights are implicated. See id. at 2-3.
165. See id. at iii-iv (listing the table of contents, which sets forth an over-
view of issues to be considered in a linking agreement, including the "Nature
of the Relationship," "Duties and Rights," "Scope of License,"
"Payments/Revenues," "Performance Requirements," "Data Collection, Use,
and Dissemination," and "Representations, Warranties, and Indemnifica-
tion"); Raysman & Brown, supra note 100, at 3 ("[Linking] agreements are of-
ten used to maintain quality standards, performance criteria for the sites,
[and] site availability [among other things].").
166. Atwood, supra note 132; see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP 12 (C.D. Cal. filed May 9, 1997) ("[A] link to Tick-
etmaster's web site is extremely valuable to other commercial web
sites... and the addition of a link to Ticketmaster's site adds value to those
other web sites by... allowing them to increase their viewership and, thus,
their advertising revenue.").
167. See Quick, supra note 163, at B6 ("[A] link has normally been viewed
as a favor: The more sites that contain a link to yours, the more potential
traffic for you.").
168. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Suits-a-Rama: The Virtual World Gets More Li-
tigious-and Weird, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30, 1996, at B20 (discussing opposition to
linking within a site and describing how "Television New Zealand warns Web
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The Internet community also lacks established norms to
address framing, in part because framing is a relatively recent
development. Netscape Communications, the market leader in
web browser software, introduced framing technology in early
1996 as part of its Netscape Navigator Version 2 product.16 9 It
is interesting to note that the Washington Post's web site itself
frames other sites, although it is unclear whether the company
first sought permission to frame others.170
It seems, then, that netiquette generally supports freedom
to use an HREF link. A separate norm may be arising among
commercial entities to enter into linking agreements. As web
revenue models evolve, pressure for the ability to control who
links to a web site may increase, perhaps leading to new neti-
quette or separate norms for commercial and noncommercial
linkers. Minimally, it seems likely that as businesses continue
to attempt to make money from web-related activities, they
may begin restricting access to their sites by building techno-
logical fences.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Web site owners who are concerned about unwanted link-
ing do not have to depend solely on their legal rights to prevent
it. Rather, they may employ one or more technological devices
to stop such linking.
Perhaps the easiest way to protect a site is by requiring
the user to enter a unique password to gain access.17 ' Another
relatively simple solution is for the site owner periodically to
change the page's URL manually, thus destroying the effec-
tiveness of any links to the former URL.' 72 A more complex
approach is that of dynamic paging, in which the web page is
designers not to link directly to pages within [its] site").
169. See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 16, at 144 (noting that at one point
80% of people navigating the web did so with Netscape's Navigator and de-
scribing frames as one of the "pace-setting" features introduced in version 2.0
of Navigator); see also Hartnick, supra note 101 (stating that Netscape intro-
duced framing and noting that "[olther Web browsers, such as Microsofts
Explorer, also can frame").
170. See Todd Woody, We've Been Framed, Nation's Newspapers Cry, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at 35 (describing the Post's framing practices).
171. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 100, at 3 (listing registration and
password schemes as examples of technological means to limit site access).
172. See Schlachter, supra note 71, at 46 (calling this a "low-technology
approach" to the problem).
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built only when the user executes a certain program. 73 The
reference point of dynamic pages thus changes, giving linkers
no fixed site at which to point. 4
There are also mechanisms that enable a site to prevent
linking by some sites but not others. The programmer can
write the web page's HTML code to recognize links from the
undesired site and refuse to process them. 175 Ticketmaster
employed this technique when Microsoft failed to remove its
links-Ticketmaster programmers blocked the links so that,
when Microsoft Sidewalk users clicked on the Ticketmaster
link, they received a message: 'This is an unauthorized link
and a dead end for Sidewalk." 7 6 Additionally, at least one web
site has employed technology to prevent linking to interior
pages, thus preventing linkers from bypassing the ads on the
home page.' 77 A site may also block spiders from indexing the
site in the spider's database.178
Similarly, there are technological means to prevent fram-
ing. For example, CNN, a plaintiff in the Total News case,
used technology that caused the Total News frame to dissolve
after a certain time period elapsed. 179 The L.A. Times, another
plaintiff in the case, employed technology that dissolved the
173. See id. (describing dynamic paging as involving the user executing "a
program resident on the server").
174. See id.
175. See id. ("If the sysop desires to prevent a specific site from linking to a
page, the sysop may code the page in such a way that it refuses browsers who
access the site from the forbidden linking site.").
176. David Shaw, Fierce Battles Fought Over Web Guides for Arts, Sports,
L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1997, at Al (describing how Ticketmaster blocked Micro-
soft's links).
177. Kristi Coale, Intellicast Smartens Up to Banner Bypass (visited July
14, 1997) <http'//www.wiredcom/news/technology/story/2844.hinl> (describing
how Intellicast wrote a procedure that accepts only links to the home page
and returns a "file not found" message to links to interior pages). The com-
pany was, in part, driven by concerns over lost advertising revenue. Id. "We
are completely advertiser supported and our advertisers want to know that
with each visit, we record an impression [an ad view]," said webmaster Jude
LeBlanc. Id. "[Aidvertisers typically set goals for the number of impressions,
or ad views, they want per month.... This information is gathered by looking
at server logs, which tell what pages, and subsequently, what ads, are pro-
jected." Id.
178. See Schlachter, supra note 71, at 46 (describing how sysops may prevent
robots and spiders from providing links to their web pages); see also supra
text accompanying notes 58-61 (describing spiders).
179. Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) I 37(a)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
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frame if the user went beyond the Times home page and
"clicked on certain additional hyperlinks within [the Times's]
site."180
There are, however, at least three problems with using
technological means to prevent linking. First, while these
mechanisms may prevent unwanted access, they may also frus-
trate "legitimate" access. When the web publisher wants the
broadest possible distribution of its content-for example, to
increase advertising rates and/or product sales-any step that
limits such access is at least somewhat undesirable. Second,
while some of the technological solutions are relatively inex-
pensive, none is without cost. The more resources that a pub-
lisher must devote to building fences, the less it can devote to
upgrading its site's content. Third, any technological means
can be defeated. More sophisticated programs can defeat anti-
linking measures. Web site owners could write new code to re-
spond to such technological advances, and so on. As Professor
Hardy has noted in a different context, "The problem with this
scenario is that it constitutes a kind of wasteful 'arms race' of
technological-protection schemes, with each side increasing its
spending to outperform the other's technology." 81 A particular
web site's owner would have to decide if the benefits of invest-
ing in increasingly complex technological restrictions outweigh
the costs.
D. FIRST AmENDMENT CONCERNS
Balanced against the drawbacks of giving a web publisher
an incentive to build technological fences are the First
Amendment rights of Internet users. In June, 1997, in ACLU
v. Miller, a district court in Georgia granted a preliminary in-
junction against a Georgia statute that made it a crime for:
any person... knowingly to transmit any data through a computer
network... if such data uses any... trade name, registered trade-
mark, logo.., or copyrighted symbol... which would falsely state or
imply that such person... has permission or is legally authorized to
use [it] for such purpose when such permission or authorization has
not been obtained.1
8 2
180. Id. 37(c).
181. Hardy, supra note 3, at 251.
182. ACLU v. Miller, No. CIV.A. 1:96CV2475MHS, 1997 WL 552487, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 1997).
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The statute was ostensibly aimed at limiting the ability to use
trade names and trademarks as pointers.183
The court stated that "plaintiffs are likely to prove that the
statute imposes content-based restrictions which are not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the state's purported compelling in-
terest.""8 In a footnote, the court discussed the statute's im-
pact on linking:
A fair reading of [this] clause, as written, is that it prohibits the cur-
rent use of web page links. The linking function requires publishers
of web pages to include symbols designating other web pages which
may be of interest to a user. This means that an entity or person's
seal may appear on hundreds or thousands of other web pages, just
for the purpose of enabling the linking system. The appearance of
the seal, although completely innocuous, would definitely "imply" to
many users that permission for use had been obtained. Defendants
have articulated no compelling state interest that would be furthered
by restricting the linking function in this way. 85
This is the first court to indicate that linking may be considered
speech and that restrictions on it may implicate First Amend-
ment concerns.
The Supreme Court, in Reno v. ACLU,186 decided about the
same time as Miller, described the Internet as a "new market-
place of ideas" 187 and the web as "a vast library including mil-
lions of readily available and indexed publications and a
sprawling mall offering goods and services."'88 In the case, the
Court held that there was no basis for "qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny" applicable to the Internet.189 The
Court has traditionally "recognized special justifications for
regulation of the broadcast media ... [including] the history of
extensive government regulation of the broadcast me-
dium ... the scarcity of available frequencies ... and its
'invasive' nature."' 9° These characteristics justifying lesser
scrutiny simply are not present on the Internet. While Reno
did not address linking, it did indicate the Court's acknowl-
edgment of the Internet as an important medium of expression,
deserving First Amendment protection.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *2.
185. Id. at *6 n.5.
186. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
187. Id. at 2351.
188. Id. at 2335.
189. Id. at 2344.
190. Id. at 2343.
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The Miller and Reno views of the Internet make good sense.
If the Internet is to realize its potential as a "marketplace of
ideas," then restrictions on the ability to exchange those ideas
seem inherently troublesome and worthy of further considera-
tion. This in turn suggests that the intellectual property laws
should, if possible, be interpreted to accommodate these First
Amendment considerations.
E. PUTTING THE POLICY TOGETHER-A LIMITED PROPERTY
RIGHT TO LINK
The temptation to place the entitlement with the linked
web site's owner is strong. It is a simple matter for a linker to
seek permission to connect to another site, and usually the
linked site would not object to the connection. Thus, under a
legal rule requiring permission to link, linking would continue
much as it has in the past. Moreover, the wasteful technologi-
cal "arms race" could be avoided by placing the entitlement
with the linked web site's owner. Additionally, this assign-
ment of rights seems consistent with Calabresi and Melamed's
general theory that, "in the absence of certainty as to whether
a benefit is worth its costs to society,.., the cost should be put
on the party or activity best located to make such a cost-benefit
analysis."191 There is some social benefit to the freedom to link
but also some costs. Web site owners may build technological
fences or otherwise adjust their content to deal with unwanted
linking. The party in the best position to weigh these costs is
probably the owner of the linked site because it may more ac-
curately value its own goodwill and the cost of unwanted asso-
ciations. As one lawyer has stated, "Links establish a connec-
tion between two businesses, and people really want to be able
to control that.... A lot of our clients get upset with pornog-
raphy sites linking to them-they don't want that kind of con-
nection.... [Tihis is an issue of who businesses want to have
promoting them."192
This analysis is, however, an oversimplification. First, if
the entitlement is placed with the owner of the linked site, it is
doubtful that linking would continue as it has to date. If a
linker must first request permission, its ability to employ the
link will be at best delayed, frustrating the "marketplace of
191. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 148, at 1096.
192. Quick, supra note 163, at B6 (quoting Suzanne R. Jones, a partner in
a Los Angeles firm specializing in intellectual property and computer law).
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ideas" that is the Internet. In other words, while the owner of
the linked site may be in the best position to weigh the costs of
unwanted linking, the owner likely fails to take into account
the social benefit of linking.
Second, existing netiquette suggests that web publishers
have calculated the costs and benefits of requiring permission
to link and have opted not to do so. The cost of processing the
huge number of requests simply outweighs the benefit of stop-
ping the few undesirable links. Moreover, the recent increase
in the number of linking agreements among businesses does
not necessarily mean that firms believe that permission to link
is required. Rather, businesses are often using linking agree-
ments to establish complementary relationships that would
otherwise not exist. These linking agreements may also simply
be a rational response by risk-averse entities to legal uncer-
tainty.
Third, the technological arms race could be avoided by
using the torts of trespass and conversion to protect technologi-
cal fences. If trespass and conversion were extended to deal
with intangible property, a linker who breaches the fence built
by a site would be liable to the site's owner." 3 Accordingly, the
193. Generally, many states sustain actions in conversion and trespass
only for interferences with tangible property. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NmIGER, NIMMR ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.01[B][1][i], at 1-35 to 1-36 (1997).
However, some courts have stated that "[ellectronic signals generated and
sent by computer have been held to be sufficiently physically tangible to sup-
port a trespass cause of action." CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that the sending of unsolicited
e-mail may constitute trespass to computer equipment and citing authorities
suggesting that unauthorized access to a computer may constitute trespass).
See also I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996
J. ONLINE L. art. 7 (suggesting that trespass may be used on the web and ex-
plaining why the trespass action may not be preempted by copyright law); Val
D. Ricks, Note, The Conversion of Intangible Property: Bursting the Ancient
Trover Bottle With New Wine, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1698-1714
(discussing conversion of intangible property).
In the context discussed in this Article, the action for trespass or conver-
sion would be based on unauthorized access, which is not one of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights. It could be analogized to a book owner's locking a
book in a cabinet. If an intruder broke the lock, the intruder would be liable
for trespass. The same analogy holds in the electronic context. The barrier to
access functions like a lock, and the intruder's act in breaking that lock should
constitute trespass. However, the act of accessing a site necessarily also in-
volves making a RAM copy. See infra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
The right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies is an exclusive right of
the copyright owner. Thus, it seems that a cause of action in trespass would
be preempted because it is attempting to regulate the same conduct as the
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concern about the technological arms race may be unnecessary
as these other legal doctrines may effectively limit it.
Additionally, as described in Part V.A below, a simple
technology to limit linking is a contract. A user who manifests
assent to a conspicuous contractual term limiting the ability to
use a hyperlink on his or her web page is likely to be bound by
that term. If the user violates that term, it would be liable for
breach of contract, a claim unlikely to be preempted by copy-
right.
On the other hand, there is value in the ability to link. In
the absence of legal constraints, there is every reason to expect
that a market for linking rights would develop. The increase in
linking agreements, while not dispositive, may suggest that
this market is already evolving and that the netiquette of a re-
search network should not bind an evolving commercial net-
work. Unfettered linking may frustrate the evolution of this
marketplace by placing limitations on the parties' negotiations.
For example, Ticketmaster had agreed to display prominently
MasterCard information at its site, but its ability to comply
with this agreement was frustrated by Microsoft bypassing
those ads.194
Additionally, to date, the custom of free linking has as-
sumed that the benefits to the two sites involved are equal.
There is no particular reason, however, to think that this is so
as a general matter. For example, the marginal benefit to a
new search engine of the ability to link to a popular site like
"www.ticketmaster.com" likely exceeds the marginal benefit to
Ticketmaster of one more site linking to it in addition to the
more than 5,000 sites already so linking. In such cases, the
linking site is, at least in some sense, free-riding on the linked
site's content and reputation. A legal rule allowing linking
Copyright Act. See Hardy, supra, 12 (stating that literally, the right at is-
sue could be construed as "the right to control the reading of the information,"
which is not one of the copyright owners exclusive rights, but noting that
"reading" does involve copying under current law). Professor Hardy implies
that a trespass action would be preempted unless the law is changed to hold
that RAM copies are not sufficiently fixed to constitute copies under the Act.
See id. 1 14-15. However, a cause of action is not preempted if it contains
elements that render it "qualitatively different" from a copyright cause of ac-
tion. See infra note 377. Arguably, the unauthorized access that incidentally
involves copying is such an element. The interest that the plaintiff would be
seeking to enforce-limiting access to its site-is different from the interest
that copyright law would be upholding. Thus, the cause of action may not be
preempted even if RAM copying qualifies as copying under the Act.
194 See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.
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without permission thus simply distorts the market that would
otherwise evolve.
Particularly in the cases of links to interior pages and
framing, web site owners may object because they lose control
over the presentation of the site's content. The web site was
set up with the expectation that it would be accessed through
the home page, the virtual "front door." It was also set up with
the expectation that the entire contents of the site would be
displayed more or less full screen, rather than in a window.
The ability of others to link within the site and to frame con-
tent impacts the advertising revenue of the linked site.
However, requiring permission to link "robs the Web of the
thing it does best-provide the seamless and rapid availability
of information." 195 As Microsoft stated in its answer to Ticket-
master's complaint, "This easy access is an intended conse-
quence of and fundamental to the nature of the World Wide
Web."196 This echoes the netiquette that the act of posting a
web site without restriction places the publisher in the web's
mainstream where linking without permission is the norm.
The mere fact that linking may frustrate a certain business
model does not compel the conclusion that it should only take
place with the permission of a web site owner. Business models
are continuing to evolve and have, to a certain extent, already
been premised on a norm of free linking.197
Moreover, the Internet is now an established communica-
tions medium with information exchange facilitated by linking.
To impose a rule now that requires a site to seek permission
before linking would frustrate expectations, including those
held by authors of search engines and directories that often
consist solely of links to other sites. Additionally, it would cre-
ate a barrier to entry, particularly for smaller sites that have
difficulty in being noticed.'98 Essentially, one could view web
publishers who advocate requiring permission to link as seeking
to exert power in two markets-the market for the information
posted on the web site itself and the market for providing ac-
cess through indexing to that information.
195. Quick, supra note 163, at B6 (quoting Geoff Reiss, vice president of
Starwave Corp.).
196. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Mficrosoft Corp., No. CV97-3055 RAP (ANx) 41
(May 28, 1997).
197. Cf Schlachter, supra note 71, at 22-30 (explaining how information
providers can make money while not charging for content).
198. See Quick, supra note 163, at B6.
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The situation is comparable to Time magazine informing
the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature that it did not want
its articles referenced unless the Guide first obtained Time's
permission for a listing.199 Another analogy would be to ABC-
TV complaining that the TV Guide's ability to list its pro-
gramming schedule diverts advertising dollars from ABC to TV
Guide. The difference between these two examples and linking
is the ease and immediacy with which a user can look at the
document referenced by linking. The question, of course, is
whether this easy accessibility should lead to a different sub-
stantive result. Logically, it should not. The address of a web
site is public information which a site owner cannot prevent
the linking site from publicizing. In the absence of hyperlink-
ing, all a user would need to do to access the site is to type the
address into its browser or simply "cut and paste" the address
as published. In both cases, hyperlinking takes place, yet the user
still accesses the new site as a result of the address publication
on the original site. Hyperlinking simply makes this obviously
legal means of accessing the new site somewhat easier.
Moreover, given the First Amendment concerns identified
above, the boundaries of the market in which a publisher has a
right to use its power should be defined narrowly. Also, the
barrier to entry that would be erected by a requirement to seek
permission before linking would operate almost like a prior re-
straint or undue burden on speech and should be discouraged
absent a compelling interest.
This suggests that the entitlement to link should be with
the linker, at least with respect to an HREF link to a home
page. The issue of links deep within the site is more problem-
atic. Such interior links bypass the introductory information
and ads contained on the home page and present the site's con-
tent out of context. While these policy considerations make the
question a close one, the entitlement should still rest with the
linker. If a publisher "opts in" to the web system, the publisher
knows that other sites may link to any page and should design
the site accordingly. Again, there would be no legal barrier to
another site's publishing the address of internal pages or to the
199. Cf. Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and
Sega, 1 J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 49, 115 (1993) ("[A] link user might analogize
her navigation of the links to the print reader's following a bibliographic path
set forth in a copyrighted article which would, of course, not be infringing, for
it would involve use of the knowledge in the article, not a reproduction of it.").
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user accessing those pages by entering the address into its
browser. Hyperlinking simply saves the user a small quantum
of time by removing the need for it to type the address into its
web browser.
There would, however, be limits to this entitlement. For
example, the web site owner remains free to erect technological
barriers to entry and to seek redress for their breach. Moreover,
merely stating that there is an entitlement to link says nothing
about the permissible manner of linking. The boundaries of
permissible conduct would be drawn by already existing prin-
ciples such as those embodied in the Lanham Act. For exam-
ple, despite the dicta in Miller, it is not at all clear that the
freedom to link would include the freedom of the linker to use
the logo of the linked site's owner as its pointer.
The frame at first glance seems to present more troubling
questions. The issue that framing highlights is different from
that of the HREF link. The HREF link is merely a pointer to
an address that allows the user to travel to a different site and
see another's content. The frame actually alters the display of
that content, although it does not alter the content itself. If
HREF links are a means of traveling the net, frames are a
means of displaying the content. Frames are not inherently
invidious, which suggests that the same rule should apply. 00
The entitlement to frame should rest with the linking site.
However, again, the manner in which a particular frame is
used may implicate legal concerns. For example, if the infor-
mation surrounding the frame misleads the viewer as to the
source of the information, the linker may be liable for trade-
mark infringement.
While a default rule giving an entitlement to link to the
linking site may be desirable for the policy reasons discussed
above, that rule will lack any force unless it is reflected in the
law. The following analysis considers current law, contending
that it will often arrive at the appropriate result but that certain
adjustments may be desirable.
IV. PUBLIC LAW IMPLICATIONS OF LINKING-THE
UNEASY FIT BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK
Neither copyright nor trademark law directly addresses
the conduct involved in linking. The failure of conventional
200. Note that web browsers like Netscape Navigator frame the sites the user
accesses. No one to date has challenged framing by web browsers.
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law to address directly new technology is not remarkable since
both the Copyright and Lanham Acts were drafted and revised
before the Internet became a broad-based communications
medium. However, one need not conclude that these laws must
be revised or that they have no guidance to offer. Rather, ad-
dressing new contexts with old laws presents an opportunity to
refocus on the policies underlying those laws. This analysis
highlights the differing theoretical constructs of copyright and
trademark law. It suggests that trademark law will become
increasingly important in cyberspace at the expense of copy-
right, leading to the conclusion that courts should guard
against using trademark to grant copyright-type rights. It ar-
gues that courts should place renewed emphasis on and con-
sider expanding the trademark fair use doctrine in fitting
copyright and trademark law together.
A. THE COPYRIGHT LAW OF LINEING
Copyright law's ultimate goal is to advance the public welfare
by encouraging the production of creative works. 0 1 It achieves
this goal by granting exclusive rights to authors whose works
meet the statutory standards."2 These exclusive rights provide
an incentive to create because they enable the author to recoup
a return on his or her investment in creating the work.203
Copyright's interest is in preventing others from undercutting
the statutory scheme by exercising one or more of the author's
exclusive rights without permission.
An obvious threshold question is whether the use of an
HREF link or a frame even implicates any copyright rights.
Technically, in the case of both HREF links and frames, the
copy is made by the copyright owner's server at the request of
20L See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, at S1, S7 (1976) ('The enactment of
copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not
based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings... but upon
the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and
useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the ex-
clusive rights to their writings.").
202. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996) (stating requirements for pro-
tection); id. § 106 (setting forth the exclusive rights of the copyright owner).
203. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 325 (1989); Wendy J. Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and
Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
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the linking site.20 4 This conduct seems analogous to that of a
magazine publisher receiving a subscription request from a
customer and responding by sending the magazine. No one
suggests that copyright rights are implicated in that act. What
then is the argument that linking implicates copyright
rights? 25
The argument is based on the Copyright Act, current
caselaw, and the way in which web browsers work. These con-
siderations suggest that an HREF link implicates the copy-
right owner's exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies
while the frame arguably implicates the exclusive right to pre-
pare derivative works. 206
Under the Act, a copy is defined as a "material ob-
ject[]... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device."20 7 Recent caselaw has indi-
cated that transitory storage in RAM qualifies as a fixation.20 8
The Clinton Administration, through its "White Paper" issued
by the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, has in-
dicated its belief that when a user accesses a file on an Internet
server "a copy of at least the portion viewed is made in the
204. See Schlachter, supra note 71, at 45.
Most copyright experts generally believe that linking should not lead
to copyright liability, because the mechanical operation of the hyper-
text link does not implicate one of the exclusive rights of copyright
owners; a hypertext-linked URL is merely an instruction which is
loaded into the user's browser software, and the browser software
does all of the work from there. As a result, the server providing the
hypertext link never makes a copy or otherwise processes any of the
data from the linked site.
Id. (citation omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 108-119 (explaining
the technical aspects of linking).
205. See Allen R. Grogan, Implied Licensing Issues in the Online World,
COMPUTER L., Aug. 1997, at 1, 1 (discussing how ordinary web activities may
implicate copyright rights).
206. HREF links and frames may also implicate the copyright owner's ex-
clusive right to distribute copies of the work or to display the copyrighted
work publicly. But see Jackson, supra note 116, at 748-52 (arguing that HREF
links do not violate these rights).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
208. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); accord Triad Sys. Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996); Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845
F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994). Note, however, that the Peak decision is
controversial. See Jackson, supra note 116, at 744.
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user's computer. Without such copying into RAM... no screen
display would be possible."2 9 While this copy in RAM was
made and sent by the copyright owner's server, it was initiated
by the user. In some sense, it is unlike the magazine example
in which the publisher actually processes the request. Users
make the copy by downloading the web page from the server to
their RAM for display on the screen.
Even if the copy in RAM does not implicate the copyright
owner's exclusive rights, there is likely to be another copy on
the user's hard drive. This will likely occur because web
browsers often copy the contents of a web page onto the user's
hard drive to allow quicker access to the page's contents as users
switch back and forth between web sites.21 0 This copy may re-
main on the hard drive after the computer is shut off.211
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works addresses
conduct different from the exclusive right to reproduce. The
Act defines derivative work as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation... abridgment, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted."212 The copyright owner has the ex-
clusive right to "prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work" and to authorize others to prepare such de-
rivative works.213  Framing may implicate the copyright
owner's exclusive right to prepare derivative works because it
209. WORKING GROUP ON hTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 37 (1995); see also
Jackson, supra note 116, at 746 (reviewing one decision that made conflicting
statements about whether browsing a document implicated the copyright
owner's exclusive right of reproduction). Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights and the Global Information Economy, COMM. ACM, Jan, 1,
1996, at 23 (stating that authors of the White Paper consider browsing of digi-
tal works to implicate the right of reproduction because browsing requires the
making of a temporary copy and noting that this contention is at odds with
"plain statements in the Congressional reports").
210. This process is called "caching." See Schlachter, supra note 71, at 47
(explaining that "[claching is a loosely used term that generally refers to the
process of making an extra copy of a file or set of files for more convenient re-
trieval"). Caching is important because it increases speed and reduces the
infrastructure needed to keep the Internet running. Id.; see also Perritt, supra
note 4, at 299-301 (discussing different types of caching and noting that it is
widely used).
211. See Perritt, supra note 4, at 316 (noting that Netscape "preserves
cached files after a Netscape session is terminated").
212. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
213. Id. § 106(2).
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arguably takes the original work and recasts it in a different
form.
Irrespective of which exclusive right is at issue, it is impor-
tant to understand the legal distinction between direct and
contributory infringement. The direct infringer is the party
that makes the copy or creates the derivative work. In the case
of both HREF links and frames, the party in the position of the
direct infringer is the user, not the author of the linking web
page. The web page author may be a contributory infringer if
the author, "with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct" of
the user.214 However, if the user is not an infringer or its in-
fringement is excused, then the web site author cannot be a
contributory infringer.215
1. The HREF Link
In assessing the copyright implications of an HREF link,
most commentators have focused on the doctrine holding that a
copyright license may be implied by conduct. They assert
simply that the web page owner's act of placing the information
on the web, knowing that the web is navigated by links, implies
a license in favor of users that link to it. 216 Thus, the user is
not an infringer because he or she is licensed. Likewise, the
author of the web page that incorporates the link cannot be a
contributory infringer.
The use of an implied license to sanction an HREF link
may represent a slight expansion of current copyright implied
214. Gershwin Pubrg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). Note that under this definition the
web browser supplier may also be a contributory infringer.
215. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 193, § 12.04[A][3]1[a] at 12-86 to
12-87 ("[ilt would be more in keeping with traditional notions of third party
liability to confine the inquiry into whether there can be culpable participation in
an infringement to only those instances when such infringement has in fact
occurred.") (footnotes omitted); Jackson, supra note 116, at 741-42 ("[Tlhere
can be no contributory infringement without direct infringement.") (footnote
omitted).
216. See ROSENOER, supra note 153; Freeling & Levi, supra note 99, at S5
(stating that the web site user has an implied license to view web information
and that the act of posting information to an unrestricted web site is the basis
for implying that license); Hartnick, supra note 101, at 5 ("Analytically, there
is an implied license for the person or party creating a link so that users by
linking may access material on the pointed site that may encompass copy-
righted content."); see also Grogan, supra note 205, at 2-3 (discussing the use
of the implied license doctrine to address certain web conduct).
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license law. Most of the copyright implied license cases involve
situations in which there was some type of relationship (often
an employment one) between the licensor and licensee.217 In
contrast, both the author of the web page containing the link
and the user are likely to be strangers to the party owning the
linked site. The basis for implying a license then is not any
communication between the parties, but solely the conduct of
the linked party in putting an unrestricted site on the web.
The case offering the best support for an implied license
theory in this context is American Institute of Architects v.
Fenichel.21 8 In that case, the court held that the plaintiffs act
of placing a book of forms on the market impliedly authorized
purchasers to use those forms privately. 219 The court stated,
"This conclusion follows from the nature of a book of forms. No
one reads them as literature; their sole value is in their usabil-
ity."n ° The same arguments that supported a netiquette of not
requiring permission to link also support implying a license
under Fenichel. An unrestricted web site is placed on the mar-
ket for others to view. Its value is not solely in its content, but
also in its accessibility. Thus, Fenichel seems to support an
implied license to use BREF links. The web site originator
posts the site knowing that it will be readily accessible and, by
not taking steps to limit access, accedes to the linking of others.
Nonetheless, this argument seems at odds with traditional
notions of copyright. It has never been a requirement that the
copyright owner take all possible steps to insulate the copy-
righted material from infringement in order to qualify for pro-
tection."1 However, at least one commentator has noted that it
217. See, e.g., IAE., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 774-77 (7th Cir. 1996)
(implying a license for preliminary drawings of an airport hanger where the
architect prepared the drawings for a fixed fee and delivered them without
warning that he would consider further use to be copyright infringement); Ef-
fects Assoc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990) (implying a license
to use special effects footage created at the defendant's request and delivered
with the intent that the defendant copy and distribute it); Oddo v. Ries, 743
F.2d 630, 632-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a partner impliedly licensed the
partnership to use portions of his previously published magazine articles that
he incorporated into a manuscript written for the partnership).
218. 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
219. See id. at 147.
220. Id.
221. See Schlachter, supra note 71, at 49 ("No other situation come [sic] to
mind where a copyright owner's failure to use technological protective controls
has the effect of diminishing their rights under copyright law.") (footnote
omitted).
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may be appropriate to interpret the rules differently in cyber-
space. 222 He contends that
[ilf we want the Internet to work as it currently operates and as it
can operate in the future, we must reduce the chilling effect of the
threat of copyright litigation by changing the rules (or interpreting
them differently) or placing some burden on intellectual propert
owners to "opt out" of the system by deploying technology controls. 22 1
In some ways, this argument echoes the First Amendment
concerns of the Miller court. To facilitate the maintenance of
the Internet as a true "marketplace of ideas," it may be appro-
priate, at least with respect to generic HREF links, to require
web site owners to take technological steps to "opt out" of the
system of free linking.
The question then arises as to whether the result under
copyright law is any different if the user links directly to one of the
site's interior pages. Site owners probably expect users to link
first to the home page, the virtual "front door." Additionally, as
discussed above, site owners may have legitimate concerns
about users linking deeply within their sites.224 This suggests
that the web site owner does not grant an implied license to
link to interior pages merely by placing the site on the web
without restriction.
However, web site owners do place their sites on the web
knowing that the URL of a home page functionally looks the
same to a computer as the URL of an interior page. It simply
specifies a different address. Additionally, many users add
"bookmarks" to their web browsers to mark pages that they ac-
cess regularly. A bookmark allows the user to travel directly to
the marked page whether or not it is a home page. Thus, while
initially the web site owner may expect entry though the home
page, he or she knows that interior pages are likely to be ac-
cessed directly once bookmarked. The site owner can design
the site intentionally to limit linking to such interior pages.
These countervailing considerations indicate that, while the
argument for an implied license is weaker in the context of
links to interior pages than it is for links to the home page, it is
still tenable.
While an implied license theory may support allowing
linking without permission, the scope of the implied license is
an open question. In most copyright implied license cases, the
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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scope is defined by considering the communication between the
parties.25 In the Internet context, there is usually no such
communication.
In defining the scope of the implied license, it may be help-
ful to look to the fair use doctrine of copyright. Generally, fair
use is an affirmative defense that excuses otherwise infringing
conduct. 6 Fair use might be used in two ways in assessing
HREF links. Because of the lack of communication between
the parties to provide a basis for objectively determining the
scope of the implied license, it may be appropriate to turn to
fair use as the statutory license granted in such situations.
Second, fair use offers an alternative legal grounds for uphold-
ing linking without permission.227
In assessing a claim of fair use, a court weighs the non-
exclusive statutory fair use factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work-8
While no one factor is dispositive, courts have often em-
phasized the first and the fourth.229 These factors most impli-
cate the basic policy question of whether an author will have
an incentive to create if infringements will be excused under
fair use.
Even if the act of linking were an infringement, the ordi-
nary user should be protected under fair use. The use is nor-
mally for noncommercial purposes, and it generally expands
the market for the copyrighted work. Additionally, while the
web page itself may be quite creative, it is also a work that
must be accessed by some means in order to be read. Linking
is one way to access it. Accessing the web page does make a
copy of the whole work, but the fact that this one fair use factor
weighs against the linker should not be dispositive.
225. See supra note 217 (citing implied license cases).
226. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 193, § 13.05, at 13-149.
227. Note that this approach effectively equates the implied license and
fair use inquiries.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (1996).
229. See Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transforma-
tive Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion From Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 60 BROOY. L. REV. 1653, 1678-79 (1995).
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Thus, copyright law is unlikely to offer meaningful redress
to a firm that objects to an HREF link. The user's act of link-
ing should be protected by either an implied license or fair use.
Because the user's act is not infringing, neither is that of the
linking site. However, to say that there is a right to link says
little about what one can do with the information once it has
been accessed. This is one way of characterizing the issue in
the Total News case, where the crucial issue was whether a
linking site may display the linked site in less than a full
screen, "framing" it with content originating from the linking
site.
2. The Frame
The exclusive right most likely to be infringed by a user
employing a frame is the copyright owner's exclusive right to
prepare derivative works. This doctrine fits somewhat more
comfortably in the electronic world than the exclusive right to
reproduce the work in copies because an infringing derivative
work does not have to be embodied in a copy. Obviously, in
finding that a defendant has prepared an infringing derivative
work, a necessary threshold question is whether the defen-
dant's work meets the statutory definition of "derivative
work."230
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Systems,
Inc.,231 which involved facts somewhat analogous to those in
the Total News case, briefly addressed just that question. In
Paramount Pictures, Paramount Home Video (PHV) distrib-
uted video cassettes of films to distributors who in turn mar-
keted to retailers.232 Some of the cassettes contained Pepsi
commercials at their outset under a deal between PHV and
Pepsi in which PHV agreed not to place other paid advertise-
ments on the cassettes.233 Video Broadcasting Systems, Inc.
(VBS) sold advertising on the leader part of the tape of videos
sold by or rented from retail stores.234 "VBS charge[d] its ad-
vertising clients a fee for each videocassette upon which [an]
advertisement [was] recorded. The video retail stores [were] in
230. See supra text accompanying note 212 (setting forth the statutory
definition of "derivative work").
231. 724 F. Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989).
232. See id. at 811.
233. See id. at 811-12.
234. See id. at 812.
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turn paid a fee for those advertisements placed upon their
videocassettes."2 35 Some of the ads, including one for Coca-
Cola, overlapped the pre-recorded Pepsi ads.236
Among other claims, Paramount sued for copyright in-
fringement, claiming "that by adding the advertisements to the
videocassette the defendants... created unauthorized deriva-
tive works."3 7 In a brief analysis,2 3 the court held that the de-
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 821; see also infra text accompanying notes 319-325 (discussing
Paramount's Lanham Act claims).
238. The court spent most of its copyright analysis addressing the plain-
tiffs' claim that the defendants' conduct constituted "unauthorized editing of a
copyrighted work." Paramount Pictures, 724 F. Supp. at 819. The court dis-
tinguished its set of facts from those of three other cases. See id. Those cases
deserve a brief mention because they present facts somewhat similar to those
of Total News.
In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit held that United Video's act of substituting its own teletext for that
supplied to it for retransmission by WGN constituted copyright infringement.
693 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit cited Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), to support its in-
fringement finding. See WGN, 693 F.2d at 625. In Gilliam, the plaintiff writ-
ers objected to ABC's plan to broadcast edited versions of programs that the
plaintiffs had licensed to ABC. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17-18. The court held
that unauthorized editing, if established, would exceed the scope of the license
and infringe the plaintiffs' copyright. See id. at 21. The facts in Total News
may be distinguished from those in both WGN and Gilliam. Total News did
not substitute its ads in the same way that United Video did, and it did not
engage in unauthorized editing as in Gilliam because Total News did not alter
the content of the plaintiffs' sites.
The third case distinguished by Paramount Pictures was National Bank
of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980). In that
case, the court, citing Gilliam, held that "the addition of advertising material
to the text of a book.., was an infringement of the copyright if the addition
was done without authority." Id. at 544. This case resembles Total News be-
cause Total News could be described as adding ads to the plaintiffs' sites in
some way. It offers little guidance, however, because the crux of the issue in
Shaklee was whether defendants had exceeded the scope of the license. See
id. at 544 (noting that the contract required approval for the use of the plain-
tiffs name in connection with a commercial venture and that such approval
was not obtained).
Paramount Pictures distinguished the cases by agreeing with Nimmer's
characterization of them as involving decisions based on a moral rights theory.
724 F. Supp. at 819. The court cited his discussion, which notes that Ameri-
can copyright law has not adopted moral rights expressly. See id. The court
further stated, "Aware of the role and stature of these decisions in the gen-
eral field of copyright law, this court is reluctant to extend their holdings be-
yond their controlling facts." Id; cf. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th
Cir. 1997) (noting that "[ulntil recently it was accepted wisdom that the
United States did not enforce any claim of moral rights, even bowdlerization
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fendants had not prepared a derivative work because "[w]hile
defendants' advertisement is an original work, the court does
not recognize the addition of it to a videocassette in any way
recasting, transforming or adapting the motion picture. The
result is not a new version of the motion picture [and therefore
does not constitute a derivative work.]" 23 9
What then does qualify as a derivative work? More spe-
cifically, does Total News's act in surrounding the framed sites
with advertising transform the sites so as to create a derivative
work? The leading cases conflict. In Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque AR.T. Co.,240 the Ninth Circuit held that, where a
seller removed prints from a book, mounted them on ceramic
tiles, and resold them, the tiles constituted an infringing de-
rivative work."4
Both the authors of the leading copyright treatise242 and
some courts have been critical of Mirage. For example, in Lee
v. Deck the Walls, Inc.,243 an Illinois district court expressly
disavowed it, holding that the defendants' conduct in mounting
copyrighted notecards onto ceramic titles did not constitute the
preparation of an infringing derivative work.2"
The Lee court stated that, in order for a work to constitute a
"derivative work," it must itself be "independently copyrightable
... [and] demonstrate the author's originality."245 The court
stated:
[T]he defendant purchased a copyrighted work, the purchaser made
no alterations to the work itself, the purchaser did, however,
.surround" the work with additional material, and the purchaser
subsequently sold the work with the additions. Thus... the ceramic
tiles do not rise to the level of an original work of authorship ....
[Defendant] did nothing more than compete with [plaintiff] by resell-
ing individual goods purchased from [plaintiff] in bulk. Competition
is not infringement.24
of a work was permitted unless the modifications produced a new work so dif-
ferent that it infringed the exclusive right under § 106(2)" and inviting com-
parison between the WGN and Gilliam cases).
239. Paramount Pictures, 724 F. Supp. at 821.
240. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
241. See id. at 1342-43.
242. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 193, § 3.03, at 3-12-13 (arguing
that the Mirage "court's analysis was in error").
243. 925 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. IlM. 1996).
244. See id. at 579-80.
245. Id. at 580-81 (citation omitted).
246. Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
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In a very recent case involving facts similar to those in
both the Lee and Mirage cases, the Seventh Circuit broke with
the Ninth Circuit's approach, holding that where the defendant
bought notecards and mounted them on ceramic tiles, it did not
create an infringing derivative work. 47 The court, while not
holding that originality is required for the creation of a deriva-
tive work, did offer support for the district court's conclusion
that the tiles were not original: "[The caselaw] show[s] that
neither [plaintiff nor defendant] could have obtained a copy-
right in the card-on-a-tile, thereby not only extending the pe-
riod of protection for the images but also eliminating competi-
tion in one medium of display."2 48 The court also stated that
the tiles could not be derivative works because they did not
transform the work in any way. It said that "[i]f mounting
works a 'transformation,' then changing a painting's frame or
photograph's mat equally produces a derivative work. Indeed,
if [plaintiff] is right... then any alteration of a work, however
slight, requires the author's permission."249
Since Mirage, the Ninth Circuit has had occasion to ad-
dress the derivative work question in the electronic context in
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo, Inc.25 ° In that case, Ga-
loob had manufactured the "Game Genie," a device that, when
inserted between the Nintendo home video game system (NES)
and a Nintendo cartridge, altered certain features of Nintendo
games as they appeared on the screen.2"' In altering those fea-
tures, the Game Genie did not change any of the data con-
tained in Nintendo game cartridges.252 Instead, it worked by
blocking certain data sent from a Nintendo cartridge to the
NES and replacing that data temporarily with a new value. 3
The court held that the audiovisual displays produced by
the Game Genie did not constitute derivative works because
they "[did] not incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in
247. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997).
248. Id. at 581.
249. Id.
250. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
251. See id. at 967. The Game Genie changed the display of Nintendo's
games by, for example, "increasting] the number of lives of the player's character,
increas[ing] the speed at which the character moves, and allow[ing] the char-
acter to float above obstacles." Id.
252. See id.
253. See id. (noting that the effects of the Game Genie were temporary).
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some concrete or permanent form." The court reconciled Mi-
rage and Galoob by stating:
The ceramic tiles [in Mirage] physically incorporated the copyrighted
works in a form that could be sold. Perhaps more importantly, sales
of the tiles supplanted purchasers' demand for the underlying works.
Our holding in Mirage Editions would have been much different if
Albuquerque A.R.T. had distributed lenses that merely enabled users
to view several artworks simultaneously.... [T]he existence of a
market does not, and cannot, determine conclusively whether a work
is an infringing derivative work. For example, although there is a
market for kaleidoscopes, it does not necessarily follow that kaleido-
scopes create unlawful derivative works when pointed at protected
artwork. The same can be said of countless other products that en-
hance, but do not replace, copyrighted works. 2m
In some ways, there are similarities between the Game
Genie and the technique used in framing. In the same way
that the Game Genie did not change any of the data contained
in the Nintendo cartridges, the framing site does not change
any of the data contained in the framed site. The framing
site's HTML code simply displays the framed site in less than a
full screen. Neither the HTML code nor the content of the
framed site is changed. Also, like the kaleidoscope, the frame
points at a protected work, displaying it in a different form. It
is more a method of display than a transformation of the
framed work. Galoob then offers support for the proposition
that no derivative work is created when a user frames a site.255
In part, the lack of clarity of the cases addressing deriva-
tive works may be attributable to a lack of precision in defining
the relationship between the first sale and derivative works
doctrines. Under the first sale doctrine, an owner of a copy of a
copyrighted work is entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of that
copy without infringing the copyright owner's exclusive right to
distribute copies of the copyrighted work. 6  In other words,
the monopoly rights of the copyright owner over distribution
extend only to the "first sale," not to the secondary market in
used goods. However, the first sale doctrine by its terms does
254. Id. at 968-69.
255. See Samuelson, supra note 199, at 114 ("As was true with Galoob's
Game Genie, the link document would contain no expression taken from the
text of the author's being linked to. Because of this, a court deciding whether
a link author had infringed the derivative work rights of authors of the docu-
ments to which he had linked would likely doubt that a derivative work had
been created under the rationale given by the Ninth Circuit in Galoob.").
256. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1996).
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not protect the reseller against infringement of the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works.
The Mirage court held that the first sale doctrine shelters
only sales of the particular copy that the defendant purchased,
not modifications of that copy. 7 In the Lee case, the court
stated that if the initial sale is rightful, a resale "using a different
method of display" is sheltered under the first sale doctrine.
258
Echoing the Lee court, the Seventh Circuit, in addressing the
claim that the tiles constituted derivative works, stated that
one might suppose this is an open and shut case under the doctrine of
first sale .... [The defendant] bought the work legitimately, mounted
it on a tile, and resold what it had purchased. Because the artist
could capture the value of her art's contribution to the finished prod-
uct as part of the price for the original transaction, the economic ra-
tionale for protecting an adaptation as 'derivative' is absent.29
If the Seventh Circuit had held the tiles to be derivative
works, the defendant's resale would not have been protected
under the first sale doctrine and the court would have
"established through the back door an extraordinarily broad
version of authors' moral rights, under which artists may block
any modification of their works of which they disapprove."
260
This seems particularly inappropriate given that the United
States has historically been reluctant to adopt the concept of
moral rights and, to the extent it has, has done so specifically
in section 106A of the Copyright Act.26' Section 106A provides
a limited right of attribution and integrity under a moral rights
theory to authors of works of visual art. 62 The historical reluc-
tance to adopt moral rights coupled with the failure of section
106A to provide a moral rights basis for derivative works gen-
erally suggests strongly that no such basis was intended by
257. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341,
1344 (9th Cir. 1988).
258. See Lee v. Deck the Walls, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 576, 583 (N.D. l. 1996).
259. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997).
260. Id. at 583; see also supra note 238 (discussing cases which seem to
have adopted a moral rights interpretation of what constitutes a derivative
work).
261. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996) ("Rights of certain authors to attribution and
integrity).
262. See generally id. at (a) (providing the author with rights to claim
authorship, to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work
of visual art which he or she did not create," to prevent certain distortions and
destructions of the work and to prevent the use of his or her name in connec-
tion with such distortions or destructions).
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Congress either in the Act as originally adopted or as amended
by section 106A.
This analysis suggests that no derivative work is created
in the act of framing. The framing site accesses the framed site
legitimately, surrounds it with additional material, and
"resells" the resulting product. The framed web site owner can
capture the value of its content in the original transaction in
which its site is accessed. The economic rationale for protect-
ing the framed site as a derivative work is as absent in this
context as it was in the Seventh Circuit's case. Even if a de-
rivative work were found, it may be appropriate to shelter the
resale under the first sale doctrine. This shelter would have to
be achieved by analogy since the first sale doctrine would not
apply literally. Restraints on alienation are disfavored in law
generally and, since preventing the resale would effectively
create moral rights in the work that Congress never intended
to grant, allowing the resale to proceed seems appropriate.
Another way to consider framing is to recognize that it is
the user who frames the site, not the author of the framing web
page. The framing web page merely "sells" the ability to frame
the site in the same way that Galoob sold the ability to speed
up Nintendo games. It does not sell the framed site in the
same way that Albuquerque sold tiles with the copyrighted
work on them. The rightful possessor of a copyrighted work
may do with it as he or she pleases, subject to the copyright
owner's exclusive rights. The scope of the copyright monopoly
granted to the author of the framed web page does not extend
to an exclusive right to control the manner in which that page
is viewed by someone with rightful access to it.
In sum, there are three ways to analyze the frame. One
argument is that it is simply a method of display and no de-
rivative work is created; therefore the right to prepare deriva-
tive works cannot be implicated.2 63 A second analysis suggests
that even if a derivative work is created, policy reasons support
allowing the framing site to make its contents available to us-
ers. A third analysis contends that users are impliedly li-
censed to obtain a copy of the web page through an HREF link.
Once they have that copy, they are free to do with it as they
please, subject to the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Those
rights do not extend to choosing the manner in which users
must view the content.
263. See Jackson, supra note 116, at 753.
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Even if framing were to implicate the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works, it is unlikely that the framed site's
owner would have any meaningful recourse against the pub-
lisher of the framing page. The direct infringer would, as in
the case of the HREF link, be the user who prepares the de-
rivative work. Although the user's conduct is unlikely to be
sheltered by an implied license, it would probably be excused
by fair use, thus insulating the publisher from liability for con-
tributory infringement.
The implied license argument that supported freedom to
employ HREF links is less useful in supporting freedom to
frame. While anyone publishing on the web knows from the
outset the manner in which the web operates-linking through
HREF links-publishers arguably could not reasonably foresee
the development of the frame. Since framing is a relatively
new technology and has already been the subject of litigation,
it is unlikely that even now an implied license to frame exists.
Fair use, however, is likely again to offer the user shel-
ter.2" As with the HREF link, the use of the work is for a non-
commercial purpose and it probably expands the market for
the copyrighted work. In contrast, the second fair use factor
may weigh against the user. The nature of the work is usually
creative, and it does not have to be viewed through a frame. At
first glance, the third factor would also seem to weigh against
the user since the framed site is copied in its entirety. How-
ever, in the Galoob case, the court found that the fact that "the
derivative works created by the Game Genie [were] comprised
almost entirely of Nintendo's copyrighted displays [did] not
militate against a finding of fair use."265 The Galoob court re-
lied on wording from a Supreme Court case stating that "when
one considers .. .that [the device at issue] merely enables a
viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness
in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is re-
produced does not have its ordinary effect of militating against
a finding of fair use."266 In framing, the HTML code of the
framing site "merely enables a viewer to see" the framed site-
264. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
265. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir.
1992).
266. Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984)). In Sony, the Court held that Sony was not guilty of contributory in-
fringement for marketing video tape recorders which allowed TV viewers to
tape broadcasts. 464 U.S. at 456.
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albeit in a different format--"which he had been invited to
witness in its entirety free of charge." Even if the second and
third factors may argue against fair use, the first and fourth,
which argue in favor of it, are likely to outweigh them.267
Therefore, copyright law seems to grant an implied license
to the user to employ BREF links or, alternatively, fair use
rights to use HREF links. It also seems to support a fair use
right to employ frames. Because the copyright law shelters the
user's conduct, it also shelters the linking web page publisher
from liability for contributory infringement.268  This is not,
however, to say that all linking is permissible. Rather, web
publishers may be liable for trademark and unfair competition
torts for the manner in which they link. The key issue is how
to fit unfair competition law with the copyright law and policy
that generally sanctions unfettered linking.
B. TRADEMARK IMPLICATIONS OF LINKING
Trademark law is based on a somewhat different rationale
than copyright law. According to Professor McCarthy, "The
policies of consumer protection, property rights, economic effi-
ciency and universal concepts of justice underlie the law of trade-
marks."2 69 Trademark infringement law protects the public by
prohibiting use of the same or similar marks when such use is
likely to cause confusion or to deceive.2 0 It furthers economic
efficiency by encouraging businesses to produce quality prod-
267. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text accompanying note 215.
269. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTIY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETMION § 2.1, at 2-2 to 2-3 (4th ed. 1997) (explaining the bases of
trademark law); see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whit-
tling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L.
REV. 790, 790 (1997) (noting that trademarks serve several functions, includ-
ing product differentiation, indication of quality, and brand development).
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1996), which states in pertinent part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant -
(a) use in commerce any reproduction ... or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale ... of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce.. .or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction ... to labels, signs ... or advertisements in-
tended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the
sale... of goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant ....
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ucts and reducing consumer search costs.27 ' By protecting
marks against confusing uses, trademark law helps consumers
identify the manufacturer that is the source of a particular
product which, in turn, allows consumers to assign responsibil-
ity for product defects.2 2 This encourages businesses both to
invest in the development of symbols to identify their products
and to produce quality products.273  This saves consumer
search costs because consumers can rely on the level of quality
associated with a particular mark.274 Finally, by protecting
marks through infringement liability, trademark law protects
a business's investment or property right in a particular
mark.275
Both Ticketmaster and the plaintiffs in Total News pri-
marily complained about the diversion of advertising dollars
away from them to the linking sites.276 This alleged diversion
was all the more galling to the plaintiffs because the defen-
dants were using the ability to access plaintiffs' content to at-
tract that advertising money. The complaints thus sounded
much more in unfair competition than in copyright, as the alle-
gation was essentially that the defendants "reap[ed] where
[they had] not sown 277 by trading on the value of the plaintiffs'
businesses and marks.
Both sets of plaintiffs charged the defendants with unfair
competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and trade-
mark dilution under section 43(c). Additionally, the plaintiffs
in Total News included a trademark infringement claim based
on the framing of their sites by Total News. An analysis of
these claims suggests that some adjustments should be made
to trademark law to reconcile it with copyright law, which gen-
271. See MCCARTHY, supra note 269, § 2:3, at 2-3 ("Microeconomic theory
teaches that trademarks perform at least two important market functions: (1)
they encourage the production of quality products; and (2) they reduce the
customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.").
272. See id. § 2.4, at 2-4 (discussing the quality-signaling function of trade-
marks).
273. See id.
274. See id. § 2:5, at 2-6 to 2-9.
275. See Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Sub-
stantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FoRDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 121, 124 (1996) (stating that infringement law "has been no less
protective of companies [than consumers] that invest heavily... in raising
public awareness of their distinctive trademarks").
276. See supra Part H.B.
277. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,239 (1918).
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erally permits linking. In particular, the trademark dilution
and unfair competition claims should be interpreted narrowly
when addressing HREF links. The dilution doctrine should not
be extended to cover conduct like the defendants' in Total News
and Ticketmaster. Also, courts should consider adopting a new
fair use test to address the permissible uses of marks as hy-
perlinks under section 43(a).
1. Trademark Dilution
Federal trademark dilution is a relatively new doctrine-
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act became effective in 1996.278
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act now protects "famous" marks
against dilution caused by "another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name."2 79 Dilution is defined as
"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark
and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or de-
ception."28 ' Dilution may be enjoined under section 43(c).
There are two main types of dilution: blurring and tarnish-
ment.
Dilution by blurring occurs when the ability of the mark to
identify the trademark owner as the unique source of its goods
is weakened by others' use of the mark on different, non-
competing goods.21 For example, "Xerox ice cream" would di-
lute Xerox's trademark for its copiers by blurring the distinct-
iveness of the mark. In contrast, a trademark is diluted by
tarnishment when it is associated with inferior products or
portrayed in an unfavorable light, leading the public to believe
that the trademark owner's product lacks quality. 28 2
It is unclear which type of dilution Ticketmaster and the
plaintiffs in Total News were alleging. The Ticketmaster com-
plaint stated that "Microsoft's commercial use and appropria-
tion of Ticketmaster's name, marks and web site... has en-
hanced the value of Microsoft's web site and business and
diluted and diminished the value of Ticketmaster's web site
278. See Prager, supra note 275, at 121 (citing January 16, 1996 as the ef-
fective date of the Act).
279. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
280. Id. § 1127.
281. See Prager, supra note 275, at 123 (describing the way blurring weakens a
trademark).
282. See id. at 124.
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and business... depriving Ticketmaster of favorable advertis-
ing business and opportunities."283 As one commentator stated,
"There's no mystery what Microsoft is trying to do here, which
is suck the cachet out of Ticketmaster.... They're saying, 'If
you want Ticketmaster, go to Sidewalk.'"2 84
The Total News complaint alleged that the use of the
trademarks as hyperlinks and the framing of the plaintiffs'
sites damaged "the business and goodwill symbolized by those
trademarks.... Plaintiffs have spent considerable resources to
identify these trademarks to the public as the source of the In-
ternet versions of the print publications with which the public
already is familiar."285 The Total News complaint also sounded
in diminishment. Reuters news service licensed its content to
other web publishers who paid "for the right to display the
Reuters mark and content. Defendants' unauthorized conduct
diminishe[d] the value of the Reuters name and content to such
legitimate licensees and the selling power of the mark and con-
tent to Reuters."
286
Neither complaint stated a traditional cause of action in
dilution. There was no allegation that the defendants in either
case had used the plaintiffs' marks on a different product and
thereby blurred the distinctiveness of plaintiffs' marks. Like-
wise, there was no allegation that defendants' use of plaintiffs'
marks had tarnished the marks by bringing them into disre-
pute.
However, courts have shown some willingness to go beyond
the blurring and tarnishment rationales in cyberspace. Since
the dilution provision of the Lanham Act was enacted, one of
its primary uses has been to address domain-name disputes,
including domain-name squatting. Domain-name squatting re-
fers to a practice where a party registers a domain name
(assigned on a first come, first serve basis) containing a trade-
mark and seeks to sell it to the trademark owner later.
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,287 Dennis
Toeppen, a notorious cyber-squatter, 28 had registered the do-
283. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP 1 18 (C.D.
Cal. filed May 9, 1997).
284. Schliesel, supra note 123, at D4 (quoting one commentator's opinion
on Microsofts motivation).
285. Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 119 (PIKL) % 46-
47 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
286. Id. 48.
287. 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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main names "panavision.com" and "panaflex.com."289  Both
Panavision and Panaflex are trademarks of Panavision Inter-
national.2 1 When users accessed Toeppen's panavision.com
site, they would see a depiction of Pana, Illinois, from the air;
at the panaflex.com site, the only content was the word
"hello."291 While Toeppen's acts arguably fit within the dilu-
tion-by-blurring doctrine, the court stated that "Toeppen's con-
duct varies from the two standard dilution theories," but held that
"Toeppen's conduct, which prevented Panavision from using its
marks in a new and important business medium, has diluted
Panavision's marks within the meaning of the statute."
2 92
Unfortunately, the meaning of the statute is less clear
than the Panavision court indicated. Apparently, under that
court's view, dilution extends to conduct other than blurring
and tarnishment, but defining that conduct is a judicial func-
tion that will vary on a case-by-case basis. The legislative his-
288. In addition to "panavision.com" and "panaflex.com," Toeppen regis-
tered other business names, including:
deltaairlines.com greatamerica.com
britishairways.com neiman-marcus.com
crateandbarrel.com northwestairlines.com
ramadainn.com ussteel.com
eddiebauer.com unionpacific.com
See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D. 111. 1996).
"Toeppen is what is commonly referred to as a cyber-squatter. These indi-
viduals attempt to profit from the Internet by reserving and later reselling or
licensing domain names back to the companies that spent millions of dollars
developing the goodwill of the trademark." Id. at 1233 (citations omitted).
Arguably, cyber-squatting could be classified as dilution by blurring because
users will now associate two different products with the same name, although
they may not be confused at all about the source of either product:
"The harm caused by dilution is, for example, that the distinctiveness
of the name [Intermatic] and the favorable association that accrued
to it by virtue of [Intermatic's] commercial success would be under-
mined by the use of similar names in connection with other non-
competing and non-confusing products." If Toeppen were allowed to
use "intermatic.com," Intermatic's name and reputation would be at
Toeppen's mercy and could be associated with an unimaginable
amount of messages on Toeppen's web page. "It is the same disso-
nance that would be produced by selling cat food under the name
'Romanoff or baby carriages under the name 'Aston Martin.'"
Id. at 1240 (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 1300 (noting that Toeppen first registered "panavision.com,"
and when Panavision refused to pay $13,000 to Toeppen for that domain
name, Toeppen also registered "panaflexcom").
290. See id. at 1298.
291. See id. at 1300.
292. Id. at 1304.
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tory does indicate that "Itihe [federal] definition of dilution is
designed to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the
courts, including... blurring... tarnishment... and [I dimin-
ishment."2 9 Ticketmaster's claim seemed to be that Microsoft's
use of its marks diminished its ability to attract advertising
dollars. The plaintiffs in Total News alleged that Total News
had diminished their goodwill as well as the value of the
Reuters name in particular.
In Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund,9 the Supreme Court of
Oregon, interpreting the Oregon antidilution statute, stated:
"Justice Felix Frankfurter [has] termed the result of association of a
name with a product through use and advertising 'commercial mag-
netism.' The anti-dilution statute was designed to prevent poaching
on [the] commercial value of a distinctive trademark" ...
We hold that where a tradename possesses the distinctive quality
of favorable associational value a second use may be enjoined under
the statute whenever this is proven to be necessary in order to pre-
vent the diminution of plaintiffs name as an advertising tool among
consumers of plaintiffs product.295
This diminution in value of the name as an advertising tool
seemed to be the gravamen of both the Ticketmaster and Total
News dilution claims.
However, there are salient differences between the Wedgwood
Homes case, traditional dilution doctrine, and the Ticketmaster
and Total News claims. The Wedgwood Homes case and the
traditional dilution-by-diminishment action is really simply
another type of blurring. In the Wedgwood Homes case and
under blurring generally, there are two products, one belonging
to the mark's senior user and the other to the mark's junior
user. The junior use of the mark, while it may not confuse the
consumer, diminishes the ability of the senior user to trigger
an immediate association between itself and the mark. Addi-
tionally, neither linking claim is really based on the allegation
that the mark has been diminished in advertising to consum-
ers; on the contrary, the claim is that the mark is valuable in
advertising to consumers and that the defendants are using
the mark to divert money from the advertisers and away from
the plaintiffs.
293. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (1996) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)) (emphasis added).
294. 659 P.2d 377 (Or. 1983).
295. Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
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It is not clear that a court would find these distinctions
persuasive, however, particularly given the expansive use of
dilution in cyberspace. The purpose of dilution law is primar-
ily to further the goal of protecting the property rights of the
trademark owner rather than to protect consumers against
confusion.296 To a certain extent then, in assessing any dilution
claim, a court is faced primarily with the question of defining
the extent of the property right in a trademark that should be
protected by law.
If the property right is defined to prevent HREF linking as
trademark dilution, then the copyright law that generally stood
for the proposition that HREF links are permissible may be
frustrated. This result might be acceptable if trademark dilution
law were upholding policies specific to the dilution doctrine.
However, as already explained, hyperlinking does not impli-
cate the dilution policies of protecting the trademark owner's
property rights against blurring or tarnishment. Holding the
linker liable for dilution would not advance the goals of dilution
law but would instead frustrate copyright policy. Therefore,
courts should refrain from expansive readings of the dilution
doctrine in this context.
2. Unfair Competition
Both the Ticketmaster and Total News cases included
claims for relief predicated on the defendants' alleged violation
of section 43(a)'s prohibition against the use of:
any word, term, name, symbol, or device... or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representations of fact, which-(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection or asso-
ciation of such person with another person.2 97
Essentially, Ticketmaster and the plaintiffs in Total News
alleged that consumers were likely to believe that the defen-
dants' use of the plaintiffs' trademarks as HREF links298 was
296. See Prager, supra note 275, at 124 ("Dilution does not hurt consum-
ers; it hurts trademarks and their owners. Trademark dilution law seeks to
protect the trademark owner's rights in a mark itself .... ").
297. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1996); see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 97-3055 DDP 27 (C.D. Cal. filed May 9, 1997); Washington Post Co. v.
Total News, Inc., 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) 57-58 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
298. The act of framing the site with advertisements may also implicate
section 43(a) concerns because it may look as if the advertisers and the linked
site have some association. In fact, in the complaint, the plaintiffs in Total
News alleged that one of Total News's marketing strategies was to "expressly
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pursuant to an agreement-that there was an affiliation or as-
sociation between the owners and users of the marks that
sanctioned the defendants' use of the particular trademarks in
pointing to the plaintiffs' sites. 99 The federal district court in
the Miller case gave some credence to this contention by stating,
"The appearance of a [mark], although completely innocuous,
would definitely 'imply' to many users that permission for use
had been obtained."3 0
The cases on false implication of association often involve
defendants who attempt to profit from the plaintiffs mark by
using it in a secondary market. In recent years, movie and
television studios have increasingly derived revenue from li-
censing the use of their characters on merchandise. 30 1 Like-
promote their website to advertisers on the basis of their ability to feature
Plaintiffs' content next to commercial messages an advertiser might place in
space purchased from Defendants." Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc.,
No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) 41 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997). The real false as-
sociation, however, was not between Total News and the plaintiffs but be-
tween the advertisers and the plaintiffs' sites. Thus, the false association
claim that the plaintiffs actually had sounded more in contributory liability.
Total News provided the means to allow the advertisers to imply falsely an
association with the plaintiffs. There is an established doctrine of contribu-
tory trademark infringement as well as contributory infringement under sec-
tion 43(a). See generally Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d
Cir. 1981) (recognizing contributory infringement in a drug manufacturing
context). There is, however, a dearth of cases on liability for contributing to
the false implication of an association. Precedent finding contributory liability
for other acts under section 43(a) may allow the plaintiffs to hold Total News
liable for framing their sites with ads that were not sold by the plaintiffs.
299. See Ticketmaster, No. 97-3055 DDP 27 ("Ticketmaster asserts a
claim against Microsoft ... with respect to MicrosoWs falsely, deceptively and
misleadingly representing its association, connection or affiliation with Tick-
etmaster and the operation of Ticketmaster's business in Microsofts website
and its advertising."); Total News, No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) 47 ("Defendants'
use of Plaintiffs' marks is likely to cause and has caused consumers mistak-
enly to believe that some or all of the Defendants have an affiliation with
Plaintiffs, or that the totalnews.com website is sponsored or approved by the
Plaintiffs, or that Defendants are otherwise associated with or have obtained
permission from Plaintiffs.").
300. ACLU v. Miller, No. CIV.A 1:96CV2475MHS, 1997 WL 552487, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 1997).
30L See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of
the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 603-04 &
n.9 (1984) (stating that "[c]haracters from movies and television shows can be
found on a limitless variety of otherwise commonplace merchandise" and
noting that "[rietail products marketed under merchandising licenses are
measured in the billions of dollars"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Sym-
bols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the
Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 145-46
(1996) ("[T]here are now movies created principally for their merchandising
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wise, sports teams are increasingly licensing their logos for use
on clothing and other merchandise. 312 The efforts of such par-
ties in seeking to protect their respective revenue streams have
given rise to some of the most expansive decisions regarding
trademark protection.
For example, in the Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.30 3
case, Gay Toys was enjoined from producing a car that resem-
bled the one used by the characters in the "Dukes of Hazzard"
series.304 The district court had refused to grant the injunction,
noting both that Warner Brothers failed to state a misappro-
priation claim and that "there is nothing... to suggest that
purchasers are in any way concerned with who may manufacture
the car, nor.., that purchasers think plaintiff controls the
quality of defendant's toy or in any other way 'sponsors' it." 305
The Second Circuit reversed, stating that "Gay Toys deliber-
ately... capitalize[d] on the demand created by the 'Dukes of
Hazzard' ... in order to divert business and increase its sales
by misleading consumers as to the source and sponsorship of
the [car]."30 6 The court presumed confusion as to sponsorship
from evidence that children associated the car sold by Gay Toys
with the car used in the series.307
Cases like Gay Toys suggest that the likelihood of confusion
as to sponsorship or affiliation is less important to a finding of
unfair competition than the fact of the defendant's capitalizing
on the plaintiffs investment. Such rationale has supported
decisions enjoining the marketing of T-shirts with the plain-
tiffs logo on them308 despite the fact that some courts contend
"it would be naive to conclude that the name or emblem is de-
tie-ins").
302. See Dreyfus, supra note 301, at.145 (contending, tongue in cheek, that
recently, the need for actual athletic events to occur has declined since "teams
and players now earn so much money through control over their logos, names,
and likenesses").
303. 513 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), on re-
mand, 553 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
304. Gay Toys, 724 F.2d at 329.
305. Gay Toys, 513 F. Supp. at 1068-70 (noting that no allegation of fraud,
deception or breach of a confidential relationship was made by Warner Broth-
ers to support a misappropriation claim).
306. Gay Toys, 658 F.2d at 78.
307. See Gay Toys, 553 F. Supp. at 1020 (stating that the Second Circuit
conclusively presumed both a desire for toys sponsored by Warner Brothers
and confusion).
308. See, e.g., Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(enjoining use of the name "Rolling Stones" on T-shirts).
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sired because consumers believe that the product somehow
originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name
or emblem signifies."3 9 The cases conflict in this area for much
the same reason that they conflict in defining derivative works.
Courts simply disagree on the extent of the markets that
plaintiffs should be able to control by virtue of their ownership
of an intellectual property right. Decisions like Gay Toys that
expansively interpret section 43(a)'s test of sponsorship confu-
sion are, in fact, affording the plaintiffs a federal misappro-
priation remedy.
When a web publisher employs an HREF link, the text
setting forth the link is usually in the form of the domain name
of the site to be linked, or the trade name or logo of the com-
pany owning the linked site. The linking party is usually not
confused as to the source of the respective sites, nor, when us-
ers travel to a different site, do they assume that the linked
site controls the quality of the linking site. Certainly, though,
the linking site does capitalize on the popularity of the linked
site. Users may view the linking site as the gateway to the
destination site, enabling the linking site to divert advertisers
from the linked site. While the lack of confusion would seem to
take the case out of section 43(a), because of courts' willingness
to interpret that section broadly, if the plaintiff were to pro-
duce any credible evidence of likelihood of confusion, the court
may hold the HREF linker liable.
However, the use of a mark as an HREF link presents a
slightly different fact pattern than those involved in the garden
variety section 43(a) sponsorship claims. Most trademark in-
fringement and section 43 cases involve use of the plaintiffs
trademark to identify the defendant's goods. In contrast, in
both Ticketmaster and Total News, the defendant linkers used
the plaintiffs' trademarks to identify the plaintiffs' web site,
the genuine product.
The case most closely on point is New Kids on the Block v.
News America Publishing, Inc. 310 In that case, the rock group
'New Kids on the Block" sought to prevent certain newspapers
from using their name to conduct a telephone survey on the
topic of which "kid" was most popular.3 ' Ostensibly, the group
309. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980).
310. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
311 See id. at 304 (noting that USA Today was surveying who was "the
best on the block" and the Star was surveying "which kid is the sexiest").
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was concerned that, because there was a charge for the phone
calls, their fans would have less money to spend on the variety
of authorized New Kids products.3
12
The New Kids court set forth a nominative fair use test for
cases where "the defendant uses a trademark to describe the
plaintiff's product, rather than its own":313
[A] commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense pro-
vided he meets the following three requirements: First, the product
or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use
of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and
third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.314
The court held that the newspapers had met that test
since: (i) it was virtually impossible to identify the New Kids
without using their name; (ii) the papers used only the group's
name, not its logo; and (iii) the papers did not imply that the
New Kids somehow sponsored or endorsed their polls.315
While some courts316 and commentators 31 have criticized
the New Kids test, it offers a good model for the use of trade-
marks as hyperlinks. The New Kids test suggests minimally
that linkers should be able to use the linked sites' domain
name as an HREF link so long as they do not include any sug-
gestion of affiliation with the linked site. It is difficult to iden-
tify a site without using at least its URL or address. Using an
address as a hyperlink intrudes less on the linked site's trade-
mark rights than would use of a fanciful logo. Additionally, so
long as the linking site did not affirmatively represent itself as
affiliated with the destination site, it would be insulated from
312. See id. at 309 ("[A] dollar spent calling the newspapers' 900
lines... may well be a dollar not spent on New Kids products and services,
including the New Kids' own 900 numbers.").
313. Id. at 308.
314. Id.
315. See id. at 308-09.
316. See, e.g., National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc. v. Loompanics Enters., Inc.,
936 F. Supp. 1232, 1240-41 (D. Md. 1996) (declining to follow New Kids
"[b]ecause the New ids test is not the law of this Circuit, and because neither the
statute nor Fourth Circuit case law portend its adoption").
317. See, e.g., Derek J. Westberg, Note, New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing, Inc.: New Nominative Use Defense Increases the Likeli-
hood of Confusion Surrounding the Fair Use Defense to Trademark Infringe-
ment, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 685 (1994) (contending that the New Kids
test is simply a restatement of already existing fair use doctrine and, as such,
is likely simply to sow confusion in the area).
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trademark challenges alleging that the act of linking itself
implies an association.
This approach seems appropriate given that copyright law
generally supported the use of HREF links. If section 43(a)
were used to give an expansive interpretation of the plaintiffs
trademark rights to prevent the linking site from referring to
another, copyright policy would be frustrated. On the other
hand, when section 43(a) is truly protecting against confusion
rather than merely functioning as copyright or misappropria-
tion in disguise, it is protecting an interest different from that
of copyright. The New Kids on The Block test balances the two.
It allows linking to continue in support of copyright policies-
as well as the trademark policy of reducing consumer search
costs-but places limits on it, both to recognize the trademark
owner's rights and the policy of preventing consumer confu-
sion. It therefore provides an appropriate model for courts to
adopt in addressing the use of trademarks as hyperlinks.
3. Trademark Infringement
The section 43(a) claim of the plaintiffs in Total News ad-
dressed primarily the use of the plaintiffs' trademarks as
HREF links. These plaintiffs also brought a trademark in-
fringement claim based essentially on Total News's conduct in
framing their sites:
Defendants' unauthorized use of Plaintiffs' marks in connection with
advertisements that have not been approved by Plaintiffs for use on
their respective sites-and indeed compete with the advertisers with
whom Plaintiffs have contractual arrangements-is likely to cause
confusion and mistake and to deceive consumers as to the source or
origin of the content and advertising depicted at Defendants' website.
In addition, the manner in which Defendants cause Plaintiffs'
websites to appear within a window on Defendants' site, together
with those new and competing advertisements, and under the total-
news.com URL, is likely to cause confusion and mistake as to the
source or origin of the content and advertising depicted at Defen-
dants' website.3 1
The Total News case, however, differs from the garden va-
riety trademark infringement case. As in dilution cases, most
trademark infringement cases involve two products-one
bearing the senior user's mark and the other the junior user's.
It is this second use of the mark that is alleged to lead to con-
fusion as to source. In Total News, the product displayed was
318. Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) 52
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
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the plaintiffs genuine publication, but the content was sur-
rounded by ads that were not a part of the plaintiffs product.
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Systems,
Inc.319 involved somewhat similar facts.320 There, the court was
assessing the claim that the defendants had infringed Para-
mount's trademark by
pass[ing] off their [advertising] under the plaintiffs name and [I de-
ceiv[ing] the public into believing that the advertisements were pro-
duced or included in the videocassette bearing Paramounts trade-
mark with plaintiffs authorization, sponsorship or consent....
Plaintiffs claims under the Lanham Act are built upon two types of
alleged consumer confusion. First, whether an ordinary viewer of a
videocassette, which was rented or purchased from a video retail
store would likely believe that Paramount actually produced and re-
corded the defendants' advertisement. Second, whether the ordinary
consumer under the same circumstances would likely believe that
Paramount is connected with or has sponsored the defendants' ad-
vertisement .1
2
The trademark infringement claim in Total News was based
primarily on the first type of confusion.
32 2
319. 724 F. Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989).
320. Id. at 815. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra text ac-
companying notes 231-236. Other cases that may provide guidance in assess-
ing the trademark infringement claim are the repackaging cases. In some
sense, Total News's conduct could be viewed as taking the plaintiffs' products,
repackaging them, and making them available using the plaintiffs' trade-
marks as source identifiers. In other words, the "package" is the Total News
site that reproduces the plaintiffs' trademarks as hyperlinks. When a user
opens the package by clicking on the trademark link, the contents of the
plaintiffs' product appear to be the plaintiffs' newspaper and the ads sold by
Total News rather than the "real" contents-plaintiffs' news along with ads
sold by the plaintiffs. The cases on repackaging generally stand for the
proposition that the repackager is usually "entitled to inform consumers
through the plaintiffs name and mark" that the plaintiffs product forms the
constituent ingredients of the defendants product. See Forstmann Woolen Co.
v. Murray Sices Corp., 144 F. Supp. 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that a
garment manufacturer could inform its customers of the origin of constituent
fabrics using the trademarks of the manufacturer of those fabrics). Such a
use of the mark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition.
See id. The repackager may, however, be required to disclose its identity and
that the product has been repackaged. See MCCARTHY, supra note 269, at 25-
55 (collecting repackaging cases and culling requirements from them). The
repackager also may not be permitted to emphasize the original manufac-
turer's trademark. See id. Total News both prominently displayed the plain-
tiffs' trademarks and failed to indicate that their sites had been "repackaged."
Arguably, however, people accessing the sites knew exactly what Total News
was doing.
321. 724 F. Supp. at 813-15.
322. The plaintiffs in Total News did not allege that framing constituted
trademark infringement because of a false implication of association between
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The Paramount Pictures court considered a number of factors
in assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion 323  It em-
phasized that "the best evidence of a likelihood of confu-
sion... is actual confusion," asserting that it was particularly
important to have such evidence in that case "because of the
largely undeveloped nature of this type of advertising [on VCR
tapes and] the relatively recent technological phenomenon of
'VCRs' in the home."3 The court also emphasized that it was
not in a position to determine the level of sophistication of the
cassette purchaser and concluded by stating, "[Tihis court is
frankly skeptical that viewers actually care whether Para-
mount is the source or sponsor of the advertisement, since it is
equally likely that consumers would attach no more signifi-
cance or association to the advertisement than those that in-
undate them daily on television and other advertising medi-
UmS."
325
At least one court has distinguished Paramount Pictures.
In Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Real Color
Pages, Inc., 326 a Florida district court granted a preliminary
injunction to Bellsouth, enjoining Real Color Pages from insert-
ing its tourist guide containing advertising and tourist infor-
mation into Bellsouth's yellow pages. 7 The injunction was
based in part on the likelihood of Bellsouth prevailing on
Total News and the plaintiffs. They did, however, allege that the HREF link
falsely implied such an association. See supra text accompanying notes 141-
142.
323. See Paramount Pictures, 724 F. Supp. at 814 (stating the Tenth Circuit
test for likelihood of confusion, which is derived from the Restatement of
Torts test). The factors listed are:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-
mark or trade name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation...;
(iii) verbal translation...;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or
services marketed by the actor and those marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
Id. (citations omitted).
324. Id. at 816 (noting also that the "alleged inferior production quality of
defendants' advertisements" was a factor suggesting that evidence of actual
confusion was important in the case).
325. Id. at 817.
326. 792 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
327. See id. at 786.
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causes of action for trademark infringement and unfair com-
petition.328 The Bellsouth court distinguished Paramount Pic-
tures by noting that, in contrast to Bellsouth, the parties in
Paramount Pictures marketed dissimilar products. 3 9 The
greater the similarity between products, the more likely that
consumers will be confused. The real difference between Bell-
south and Paramount Pictures, then, was the fact that Bell-
south and Real Color Pages were competing for the same ad-
vertising dollars while Paramount Pictures and VBS were not.
In Total News, plaintiffs alleged that they competed for the
same advertising money, making the case look more like Bell-
south than Paramount Pictures. Paramount Pictures, on the
other hand, argues for a cautious approach because of the nov-
elty of the Internet. It may be-and, in fact, it probably is-the
case that Internet users do not care who sponsors the ads on
the sites they visit and they probably pay no more attention to
Internet ads than to those on TV. However, when they watch
CBS and see a commercial, they assume that the advertiser
purchased time from CBS and that the ad is being broadcast by
CBS. Similarly, when they see an ad on an Internet site, they
assume that the ad originated with the site on which it appears
to reside. Thus, the conduct in which Total News engaged in
framing the plaintiffs' site is likely to have infringed the plain-
tiffs' trademarks by confusing users as to source.
Moreover, this seems to be the right result. The plaintiffs
directly competed for the same advertisers. Total News effec-
tively used the plaintiffs' marks to divert money to it and then
repackaged its the product to make it look as if it came from
the plaintiffs. Holding Total News liable for trademark in-
fringement would not frustrate the copyright policy that gen-
erally supported framing. Trademark law here is enforcing a
policy unrelated to copyright-protecting consumers against
confusion as to source.
C. A RECAP: PUTTING COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW
TOGETHER ON THE INTERNET
Generally speaking, copyright and trademark law protect dif-
ferent interests and have different statutory goals--copyright
to encourage the production of creative works and trademark
328. See id. at 783.
329. See id.
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to protect consumers against confusion.330 Ostensibly, the
statutes should not conflict. However, in seeking to achieve
their respective statutory goals both statutes, at least in part,
protect property rights. It is this protection of property rights
that generates the potential for conflict.331 For example, copy-
right law generally stands for the proposition that HREF links
are permissible. Yet trademark dilution law or section 43(a)
may frustrate HREF linking by making it a violation of the
Lanham Act if the linker has not first obtained an agreement
allowing it to link. Copyright law also stands for the proposi-
tion that the act of framing is not copyright infringement, but
it may possibly constitute trademark infringement or unfair
competition. An analysis of these two contexts reveals clearly
both how trademark and copyright law may clash as well as
how they may effectively work together.
In the case of the HREF link, holding the linker liable
under either section 43(a) or section 43(c) would be based more
on an expansive definition of the trademark owner's property
rights than protecting consumers against confusion.332 Fur-
ther, holding the linker liable under the Lanham Act is at odds
with another trademark goal-decreasing consumer search
costs.333 The easier it is for the consumer to navigate the In-
ternet, the lower the cost of seeking product information. To
hold the linker liable looks very much like the grant of exclu-
sive rights to the owner of the linked site. By extension, this
functions as an exclusive right in the market for finding that
site. This cause of action suddenly looks much more like copy-
right or misappropriation than it does trademark. Yet trade-
mark was not intended to grant the monopoly that copyright
law would deny.334 To hold the linker liable under trademark
law is to use that law to forbid conduct where trademark poli-
cies are not really implicated.
330. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
behind copyright law); notes 269-275 and accompanying text (discussing the
policy behind trademark law).
33L Cf Klieger, supra note 269, at 865 (contending that trademark dilu-
tion law "bestows upon senior users of particular marks a property right no
less, and potentially much greater, than... copyright").
332. See id. at 851-63 (arguing that trademark dilution law unjustifiably
grants a property right in gross to the trademark owner to the detriment of
competition).
333. See id. at 854.
334. See supra Parts IVA-B (discussing the application of trademark and
copyright doctrines).
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In contrast, while an unadorned frame would pass muster
under both copyright and trademark law, a frame surrounded
by the framer's ads would probably survive a copyright test but
not a trademark analysis. This makes some sense. In holding
the framer liable for trademark infringement in such cases, the
Lanham Act is protecting the consumer against source confu-
sion, a different interest than that protected by the Copyright
Act.335
In summary, copyright and trademark law generally fit
well together. However, courts must guard against using
trademark to function as copyright, not just in cyberspace but
as a general rule. In particular, when courts are primarily en-
forcing the Lanham Act's policy of protecting the trademark
owner's property rights, they should take a closer look to ensure
that trademark is not being used as de facto copyright. If it is,
courts should either defer to the copyright policy or attempt to
reconcile the two as in New Kids on the Block.
V. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? WILL CONTRACT AND
MISAPPROPRIATION LAW REPLACE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ON THE INTERNET?
The preceding analysis suggested that HREF links and
frames should be permissible as a matter of copyright law and
should implicate trademark concerns only in traditional cases
of consumer confusion. Some commentators have suggested,
however, that on the Internet, public intellectual property law
will largely become irrelevant or be replaced by the private law
of contract and tort.336 Some contend that the Internet will be
characterized by free information3 37 while others fear that
technological innovations like electronic contracting and metered
billing will effectively eliminate intellectual property protec-
tions like fair use.338 In the case of linking, sites may contrac-
tually require permission before others link to them and/or
335. See Klieger, supra note 269, at 851-63 (asserting that the primary
policy that the Lanham Act should uphold is consumer protection).
336. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on
the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 548, 548-49 (1997) (noting that some com-
mentators suggest that copyright law is irrelevant when applied to the Inter-
net).
337. See id.
338. See Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 28, at 251-52 (describing the
"Xanadu" hypertext system, which would charge for all uses of a document,
thus eliminating the concept of "fair use").
[Vol. 82:609686
FENCING CYBERSPACE
seek a remedy for misappropriation when sites link without
permission. The public law of intellectual property, including
its fair use provisions, may fall into disuse.
However, intellectual property laws are likely to remain
important for a large part of the Internet. Boilerplate notices
against linking may be unenforceable as a matter of contract
law or preempted by federal copyright law. Additionally, while
the nature of cyberspace lends itself to claims of misappropria-
tion, the Second Circuit's decision in NBA v. Motorola, Inc.
339 if
followed by other circuits, will likely render many such claims
difficult to sustain.
A. ON-LINE CONTRACTING: THE ULTIMATE SHRINKWRAP?
The electronic era did not introduce the form contract, but
it refined it into something of an art. For years, software pub-
lishers distributed software with boilerplate license agree-
ments called "shrinkwraps."3 0 The enforceability of such con-
tracts, while a subject of extensive academic debate,341 was
rarely litigated.342 In 1996, in the only case that involved a
truly "faceless" transaction between buyer and seller, the Sev-
339. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
340. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses,
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1241 & n.5 (noting that shrinkwrap licenses became
part of commercial practice by the early 1980s). Professor Lemley describes
shrinkwrap licenses as follows: "Shrinkwrap licenses take many forms. The
prototypical example is a single piece of paper ... wrapped in transparent
plastic .... Other examples of the genre include licenses printed on the out-
side of boxes ... licenses simply included somewhere within the box, or li-
censes shrinkwrapped with the owner's manual accompanying the software."
Id. at 1241.
341. See id. at 1263-64 n.107 (collecting authorities).
342. Until the decision of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996), only three decisions involving shrinkwraps existed. See Step-Saver
Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding un-
enforceable a standard form disclaimer of warranties and limitation of reme-
dies clauses contained on a shrinkwrap license under U.C.C. § 2-207 as mate-
rial alterations); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that section 117 of the Copyright Act preempted a state
statute that permitted shrinkwrap licenses); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Soft-
ware Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 762-66 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding shrinkwrap
terms enforceable in a transaction in which a licensee opened a package with
notice that such action would result in an enforceable contract, but not en-
forceable in subsequent transactions in which such notice was lacking).
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enth Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg343 upheld a shrink-
wrap under both contract and copyright law.3 "
The particular shrinkwrap in ProCD accompanied a data-
base of phone listings that the court assumed was not pro-
tected by copyright. 45 The terms of the shrinkwrap were more
restrictive than those of the Copyright Act because they pro-
vided that the data could only be used for noncommercial pur-
poses.3 46  The defendant ignored this use restriction.347  The
court upheld the restriction as a matter of contract law under
its interpretation of Wisconsin's implementation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.348 The court also emphasized policy
considerations, stating that "[c]ompetition among vendors, not
judicial revision of a package's contents, is how consumers are
protected in a market economy."349 Finally, the court held that
the use restriction was not preempted by the Copyright Act be-
cause it created only rights between the parties that, by their
nature, differed from the exclusive rights created by the Copy-
right Act.350
The result in the ProCD case is controversial. 351  Some
critics disagree with the contractual holding because it subjects
purchasers to terms to which they never agreed.352 This lack of
343. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
344 See id. at 1449.
345. See id.
346. See id. at 1449-50 (explaining the plaintiffs marketing strategy and
noting that the use restriction applied to the search and retrieval software as
well as the database).
347. See id. at 1450 (explaining that the defendant bought the product and
ignored the use restriction by making "the latest information available over
the World Wide Web, for a price, through his corporation").
348. See id. at 1451-53.
349. Id. at 1453.
350. See id. at 1454-55.
351. For different views on the case, compare Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright
Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 53, 77-83 (1997) (agreeing generally with ProCD's preemption
holding) with Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom
of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 108-13 (1997) (disagreeing with the
court's holding in the ProCD case), and Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship
and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873, 901-02 (1997) (disagreeing
with ProCD).
352. Cf Lemley, supra note 351, at 901 n.151 (disagreeing with ProCD and
describing the shrinkwrap license, as "a form of 'contract' which is unilaterally
drafted by the intellectual property owner and is first made available to the
purchaser only after the transaction is completed"). Professor Lemley further
states that "the ProCD decision is at odds with the majority view, which re-
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consent has historically been a basis for academic challenges to
enforcing the shrinkwrap and contracts of adhesion gener-
ally.353 The on-line world of the Internet offers the potential, if
not to solve this problem, then at least to alleviate it, by requir-
ing the user to consent to the terms as a condition of access to a
site.
With the shrinkwrap, users were bound by an act such as
opening the package even though they might never see the li-
cense agreement. With an on-line contract, however, the pub-
lisher may post a contract and condition further access to the
site on the user's assent to the terms. That assent may be
manifested by hitting a particular key to indicate acceptance of
the contract. 35 The consent that seemed somewhat illusory in
the shrinkwrap context may be less so in the on-line shrink-
wrap context.
However, web site owners may seek to prevent linking
through the even simpler expedient of a true electronic
shrinkwrap by posting a notice prohibiting linking at the site.
In other words, web site owners may post the electronic
equivalent of a "No Trespassing" sign to give notice that they
forbid linking.355 The user's conduct in continuing to navigate
the site after seeing the notice may constitute acceptance. Web
site owners may then enforce breaches of this condition of use.
At least one web publisher has attempted to use just this strat-
egy. Expert Pages, a publisher of a database of experts, sued a
competitor for both breach of contract and trespass for violat-
ing a use restriction posted on the site.35 6
jects shrinkwrap licenses as being unenforceable." Id.
353. See O'Rourke, supra note 351, at 66 n.69 (collecting articles which
discuss the legal analysis of shrinkwrap licenses).
354. See Grogan, supra note 205, at 5; Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden,
On-Line Software Distribution: New Life for 'Shrinkwrap' Licenses?,
COMPUTER L., Apr. 1996, at 5 (noting that the on-line world might lessen
copyright preemption concerns because "the software vendor can structure
the transaction so that the user must give a positive indication of assent").
355. Such a legend might also be analyzed by considering whether it ne-
gates any implied license that would exist in its absence. See Grogan, supra
note 205, at 3-5.
356. See Expert Pages v. Universal Networks, Inc., No. 97-1542 SI ENE
36-43 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 1997) (contending that defendant violated the condi-
tions of free access, including prohibition against use of the information on the
web site for solicitation and that this conduct constituted breach of contract
and also arguing that the defendants' actions of entering and using interior
web pages in violation of the notice constituted trespass).
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From a web publisher's perspective, this solution is ideal.
It is less expensive to implement than the technological fences
discussed earlier 357 and allows for maximum control over linking.
It is unclear, however, whether such a strategy would be en-
forceable as a matter of contract law.35 8 ProCD's dicta does
suggest that electronic contracts for software where the user
sees the terms of sale only after accessing the software are en-
forceable.359 In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,360 decided after
ProCD, the Seventh Circuit held that the purchasers of a com-
puter were bound by a boilerplate provision contained in a con-
tract that the purchasers could not see until they opened the
box.361 The court characterized ProCD as holding that "terms
inside a box of software bind consumers who use the software
after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by re-
turning the product."362 Likewise, "by keeping the computer
[beyond the period allowed for return], the [plaintiffs] accepted
Gateway's offer, including the arbitration clause."363 Taken to-
gether, ProCD and Hill offer support for enforcing boilerplate
legends against linking. Under their rationale, the web site
publisher is free to "invite acceptance by conduct."3" The
357. See supra Part 1I.C. Note, however, that a simple legend may be a
less effective "fence" than a technological obstruction.
358. Presumably, if the linking site uses the link prior to seeing the notifi-
cation, then the notification would not bind the linking site. This situation,
however, is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. A site, certainly a
commercial site, would not link to another site unless it knew the contents of
the site to which it were linking. See Grogan, supra note 205, at 4 (noting
that some legends, literally read, would forbid the very conduct in which the
user must engage to see the legend).
359. The ProCD court, in dicta, states the following:
Much software is ordered over the Internet by purchasers who. have
never seen a box. Increasingly software arrives by wire. There is no
box; there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of information
that includes data, an application program, instructions, many limi-
tations... and the terms of sale. The user purchases a serial num-
ber, which activates the software's features. On [defendant's] argu-
ments, these unboxed sales are unfettered by terms-so the seller
has made a broad warranty and must pay consequential damages for
any shortfalls in performance, two "promises" that if taken seriously
would drive prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the
horse-and-buggy age.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
360. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
361. See id. at 1150-51.
362. Id. at 1148.
363. Id. at 1150.
364. Id. at 1149 (quoting ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452).
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user's conduct in continuing to navigate the site may constitute
its agreement to the restriction.
It is somewhat unclear whether a boilerplate legend would
be enforceable if states were to adopt the Uniform Commercial
Code's (UCC's) proposed Article 2B on "Licenses." Under the
April, 1997 draft of Article 2B, the restriction would likely be
governed under Section 2B-308, "Mass Market Licenses."365
Under section 2B-308(a), "a party adopts the terms of a mass-
market license if the party agrees or manifests assent to the
mass-market license before or in connection with the initial use
of or access to the information."366 The accompanying com-
ments indicate some intent to reject the holding in Hill as
comment 2 states, 'Unlike common law which leaves the idea
of assent undefined, this Article places significant restrictions
procedurally on the idea of manifesting assent. These restric-
tions ensure that the record be available for review and that
the assenting party make some affirmative indication of as-
sent."367
However, other sections of the draft significantly limit the
rule stated in section 2B-308(a). Under section 2B-308(f), "an
obligation.., disclosed on the product packaging or otherwise,
before payment of the license fee, or that was part of the prod-
uct description, becomes part of the contract without manifes-
tation of assent."3 68 A web publisher might successfully contend
that the legend is disclosed on the product packaging since the
product is the web site itself. Therefore, it would be enforce-
able even in the absence of the user's manifestation of assent.
Section 2B-308(b) may be the governing rule of decision in
light of the uncertainty of the applicability of the other sec-
365. See ALI, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2B, LICENSES
(Discussion Draft 1997). Under the draft, a mass market license is defined as
"a standard form that is prepared for and used in a mass market transaction."
Id. § 2B-102(a)(24). A mass market transaction, with certain exceptions, in-
cludes the following:
[A] transaction in a retail market for information, directed to the
general public as a whole under substantially the same terms for the
same information, and involving a licensee that is an end user and
acquired the information in a transaction under terms and in a
quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in the general retail
distribution.
Id. § 2B-102(a)(25).
366. Id. § 2B-308(a).
367. Id. § 2B-308 cmt. 2. The comment then suggests Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), as a comparison. See id.
368. Id. § 2B-308(f).
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tions. Under that section, a term does not become part of the
contract if the term creates an obligation or imposes a limita-
tion that:
(1) the party proposing the form should know would cause an ordi-
nary reasonable person acquiring this type of information in the mass
market to refuse the license if that party knew that the license con-
tained the particular term.369
This "reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that
the term is bizarre or oppressive.., or from the fact that it
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The infer-
ence is reinforced if the adhering party never had an opportu-
nity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden
from view."37 0 However, such terms may become party of the
contract "if the party that did not prepare the form manifests
assent to the term."37
1
It is reasonable to assert that a person connecting to the
Internet believes he or she is buying access to services like e-
mail and usenet as well as the ability to access the information
available on the Internet. The user also expects to buy the
ability to create a web page, creating links to others. This ex-
pectation is based on netiquette, the purpose of the web and
copyright law. A boilerplate legend forbidding linking would
arguably be a term that is so surprising as to be unenforceable
under Article 2B unless the party accessing the web page sepa-
rately assented to it.
Even if the restriction would be enforceable as a matter of
contract law, it may still be preempted by the Copyright Act.
Enforcement of notices against linking would effectively con-
tract around the Act's fair use provisions. Again, ProCD offers
precedent for upholding contracts generally against preemp-
tion. In holding that the contractual use restriction was not
preempted, the ProCD court made much of the distinction be-
tween contractual rights and copyright rights:
369. Id. § 2B-308(b)(1).
370. Id. cmt. 7.
37L Id. § 2B-308(c). See also id. cmt. 9:
At the heart ... of the approach adopted here is the idea that un-
known terms require some closer monitoring to avoid surprising and
oppressive terms. If the party is made aware of and assents to the
term, there is no room for argument about whether the term was un-
known to it.... Basically, if a party desires to use terms in its mass
market forms that are possibly within the exclusion [of § 2B-308(b)],
and does not wish to risk unenforceability, that licensor must struc-
ture the transaction to obtain assent by the licensee to the particular
term.
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Contracts... generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as
they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights.' Someone
who found a copy of [plaintiffs product] on the street would not be af-
fected by the shrinkwrap license-though the federal copyright laws
of their own force would limit the finder's ability to copy or transmit
the application program.
3 n
In contrast, if the information is posted on a web site,
there is no effective way in which "strangers may do as they
please." Agreement to the restriction is a condition of access to
the site.3  Accordingly, ProCD may offer indirect support for
preemption. Although the court's general rule was against
preemption of contractual provisions, the court did also state
that "we think it prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that
anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the
preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too nu-
merous to foresee."7 4 Possibly, an anti-linking notification on
a web page is just such a variation.
The ProCD court's preemption holding was based on its
construction of section 301 of the Copyright Act.375 Under that
section, "all legal rights that are equivalent to any of the ex-
clusive rights within the general scope of copyright... and
come within the subject matter of copyright... are governed
exclusively by [copyright law]." 376 Generally, courts have in-
terpreted this language to mean that any cause of action that
contains elements that render it "qualitatively different" from
a copyright cause of action is not preempted.37 7 In contractual
cases, it is usually the promise of the parties that creates the
particular obligation affecting copyright rights that makes the
action qualitatively different from one sounding in copyright.378
372. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
373. Arguably, if a user modified the site and then distributed it, strangers
could be unfettered by the contract. This possibility seems farfetched, how-
ever, as the legend would probably be technologically protected against modi-
fication.
374 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
375. See id. at 1453-55 (assessing the preemption of the contractual use
restriction under section 301(a)).
376. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1996).
377. See O'Rourke, supra note 351, at 74 (describing the preemption in-
quiry under section 301(a)).
378. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J.
479, 521-23 (1995) (discussing the "extra element7 in breach of contract cases).
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In the boilerplate license context, this assent must be inferred
because it is usually not expressly given.379
Preemption may also be constitutionally based. A contrac-
tual term may be preempted if its enforcement would "stand[]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" in enacting a particular statutory
scheme.38 ° There is a dearth of caselaw on constitutional pre-
emption of contractual clauses under copyright law since the
enactment of section 301. This scarcity may be attributable to
the fact that, in many cases, the policy considerations that a
court assesses in determining whether an action is qualita-
tively different from copyright under section 301 are the same
as it would assess in a constitutional inquiry.
There is substantial academic commentary and disagree-
ment on the question of when a contract may be preempted ei-
ther constitutionally or by section 301 of the Copyright Act.3 '
Elsewhere, I have argued that fair use should generally be
considered an alienable right in the absence of market de-
fects.382 Additionally, in an attempt to recognize the legitimate
concerns of preemption advocates, I have suggested that one
way to minimize the potential for certain market defects is to
379. See id. at 528-34 (discussing implied consent as an extra element).
380. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnote omitted).
381. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright, Contracts, and Preemption in a
Digital World, 1 U. RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995) (arguing that contract is an
important source of protection for intellectual property owners); Elkin-Koren,
supra note 351 (arguing for preemption in the ProCD case); Charles R.
McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Com-
puter Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 25 (1993) (arguing for preemption of reverse engineering provi-
sions in license agreements); O'Rourke, supra note 351 (analyzing the pre-
emption problem in the ProCD case); O'Rourke, supra note 378 (arguing
against preemption of decompilation provisions in software licenses); David A.
Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L.
REV. 543 (1992) (arguing for preemption of clauses prohibiting reverse engi-
neering under both patent and copyright law); see also Lemley, supra note
340, at 1292 (1995) (proposing that shrinkwrap terms that "imposeD a limita-
tion on the licensee that is inconsistent with federal intellectual property law,
or that deprive[] the licensee of a right or privilege granted the licensee under
federal intellectual property law" should not become part of a mass-market
license).
382. See O'Rourke, supra note 378, at 551 (suggesting that decompilation
provisions in negotiated and nonnegotiated software licenses should not be
preempted unless "the operating system provider has sufficient power effec-
tively either (1) to engage in exclusionary practices to prevent cloning, or (2)
to leverage that power into the application market").
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make clauses that restrict rights that the Copyright Act would
otherwise grant conspicuous. 383
In both analyses, a key threshold issue was defining what
customers thought they bought for the price they paid. This
helps to assess whether it would be reasonable to infer the cus-
tomer's consent to the particular boilerplate term. This in-
ferred consent would provide the extra element to save the
clause from preemption under section 301. Additionally, the
policy considerations that would generally lead one to conclude
that it was reasonable to infer such consent would militate
against constitutional preemption. For example, customers
usually buy the functionality of a software product, rather than
the ability to decompile it. 31 Thus, absent market imperfec-
tions, provisions against decompilation should not be pre-
empted.385 The ProCD case provides another example. There,
for the price the defendant paid, he had no reasonable expec-
tation that he bought the right to compete with ProCD in the
commercialization of the database.38 6 Therefore, again, pre-
emption of the term would interfere with the efficient function-
ing of markets without any clear benefit for copyright policies.
Preemption of contractual terms seems particularly inap-
propriate in a world like the Internet, which is characterized
by relatively low transaction costs and large numbers of alter-
native sources of information. Although historically users may
have expected the right to link, the market would adjust to
widespread contractual provisions against linking. The price an
Internet access provider could charge would change to reflect
the new set of contents on and terms governing the Internet.
Users would agree to the restrictions given the new pricing
structure. Thus, there seems little reason not to enforce boi-
lerplate legends against linking.
Yet, there may be broader policy reasons for arguing for
preemption as a constitutional matter. Historically, fair use
has been used to sanction unlicensed uses of information when
transaction costs are so high that consensual transactions will
383. See OQ'Rourke, supra note 351, at 85 (suggesting that a default rules
analysis of preemption argues for such a rule).
384. See O'Rourke, supra note 378, at 516 (questioning whether the end
user wants to purchase the right to decompile).
385. See supra note 382.
386. See O'Rourke, supra note 351, at 70 ("[The court implied that for the
price the buyer paid, the buyer should have expected the use restriction.").
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not occur. 87  The Internet, by decreasing transaction costs,
threatens to eliminate the fair use doctrine unless some other
theoretical justification underlies it.388
Professor Merges recently argued that the elimination of
fair use in cyberspace would be undesirable and further as-
serted that "[flair use will revolve less around market failure,
and more around the idea of favoring certain classes of users
with a statutory privilege. In economic terms, the new foun-
dation will represent a shift from emphasizing transaction
costs to emphasizing redistribution, pure and simple."8 9 A
rule that prevents parties from contracting around fair use,
particularly in a situation where we would expect efficient
markets to develop, does redistribute wealth and for no appar-
ent economic reason.
However, there are reasons for redistribution other than
purely economic ones. As already noted, the Internet has been
recognized by the Supreme Court as an important medium of
expression.39 While a market for linking may evolve, we
should ask the questions: "[Wihich class(es) of users should be
allowed to bypass the presumptive market; and.., how much
revenue should the copyright holder be forced to forego to serve
the goals of fair use?"391
A rule that preempts the enforcement of boilerplate legends
requiring permission to link, at least in the consumer context,
would not cost the copyright holder any revenue, nor, pre-
sumably, would it impact the web site owner's incentive to create
the site. Given these considerations, along with the First
Amendment implications of linking, it seems reasonable to as-
sert that boilerplate legends against linking should be consti-
tutionally preempted when a user wants to include a hyperlink
to another site on its web page for noncommercial purposes. In
387. See Gordon, supra note 203.
388. See Merges, supra note 149, at 130 ("[B]ecause... electronic ex-
change potentially eliminates... market failure for digital content, fair use
law will significantly shrink, or an alternative basis for fair use will be redis-
covered."). But see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intel-
lectual Property Law, 75 TFx L. REv. 989, 1077-83 (1997) (discussing fair use
as a doctrine that may protect "transformative" uses).
389. Merges, supra note 149, at 134.
390. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2331 (1997) (defining the In-
ternet as "an international network of interconnected computers that enables
millions of people to communicate with one another in 'cyberspace' and to ac-
cess vast amounts of information from around the world").
391. Merges, supra note 149, at 135.
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other words, if a web site owner wishes to require permission
to link, the burden should be placed on the owner to formulate
a contract that both makes that restriction conspicuous and re-
quires an affirmative act of assent to that term. Consent would
not be inferred by the mere presence of a restrictive notice.
The same arguments against these legends could be ap-
plied in the commercial context as well. However, in that con-
text, the copyright holder may be forced to forego revenue if the
legend is unenforceable against sites linking for commercial
reasons. Advertising dollars may be diverted from the linked
to the "gateway" linking site. This may prove undesirable and
may provide a policy reason against preemption in the context
of commercial sites. Yet, because even the commercial linker
simply points to a site and allows users to access it easily, fur-
thering the copyright and First Amendment goals of dissemi-
nation of information, the argument for constitutional pre-
emption is strong, even in a commercial setting. Similarly, as
in the noncommercial context, the same conspicuous contrac-
tual provision requiring affirmative assent to link could be
used to regulate linking conduct.
Finally, even the approach of requiring contractual terms
limiting hyperlinking to be conspicuous and separately agreed
to might be troublesome from a copyright perspective, particu-
larly if such clauses become ubiquitous. They would begin to
resemble copyright rights against the world rather than con-
tractual rights between two parties. However, current evi-
dence indicates that while electronic contracts are increasing,
information providers are hesitant to employ them because
they may discourage users from entering the site.392 This sug-
gests that competition is working in cyberspace and that the
law should be reluctant to preempt contractual provisions
when it is clear that users are aware of and have agreed to
them. However, if the terms do become standard, the law
should be willing to take a closer look to determine whether
they should be preempted.
B. MISAPPROPRIATION-THE LnMrTs OF THE "HOT NEWS"
DocTRiNE
Irrespective of whether site owners use contract in one way
or another to limit linking, many are likely to bring causes of
action in misappropriation when a linking site uses the linked
392. See infra note 410.
6971998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
site's content in making money. These causes of action are
even more likely to fall in a copyright preemption analysis than
those sounding only in contract.
Both the Ticketmaster and Total News cases-and operation
of the Internet itself-involve a measure of free-riding. The
ability to incorporate links to other documents enables the
linking site to free-ride in some measure on the content of the
linked site. But does this free-riding constitute misappropria-
tion? Many plaintiffs are likely to assert that it does. How-
ever, the Second Circuit's decision in NBA v. Motorola, Inc.,393
interpreting the Supreme Court's 1918 decision in Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press,394 suggests that in
most cases, it does not.
In Motorola, the Second Circuit addressed a claim by the
NBA that Motorola's practice of transmitting data on NBA
games still in progress via its pagers constituted misappro-
priation under New York law.395 The court noted that histori-
cally, technology has enabled "entrepreneurs ... to use the
transmissions of others in one way or another for their own
profit."396 The question, of course, is when does that use consti-
tute a misappropriation that is not preempted by the Copyright
Act? According to the court,
the surviving "hot-news" INS-like claim is limited to cases where (i) a
plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the information
is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendants' use of the information constitutes
free riding on the plaintiffs efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct
competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v)
the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or
others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or serv-
ice that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.3
The court narrowed its definition of the claim that would
survive preemption because it believed that "[a] broad misap-
propriation doctrine based on amorphous concepts such as
'commercial immorality'.., is preempted... [as] virtually syn-
onymous [with] wrongful copying and... [is] in no meaningful
fashion distinguishable from infringement of a copyright."398
The elements of the claim as defined by the court that render it
different from copyright are time-sensitivity, free-riding, and
393. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
394. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
395. NBA, 105 F.3d at 843-44.
396. Id. at 845.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 851.
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the threat to the existence of the plaintiffs product. 99 The
court contended that "INS is not about ethics; it is about the
protection of property rights in time-sensitive information so
that the information will be made available to the public by
profit seeking entrepreneurs. 
" 40
A threshold question in conducting a Motorola misappro-
priation inquiry is defining the product allegedly misappropri-
ated. Presumably, it would be the information contained on
the linked web site. Generally, this information is gathered at
some cost by the publisher, satisfying the first prong of the
test. The information, however, is not always time-sensitive.
Many Internet sites are updated infrequently. In contrast,
both the Ticketmaster site and the sites of the plaintiff news
publishers in Total News would probably be considered to con-
tain time-sensitive information, thus satisfying the second
prong of the test. Third, as already discussed, the ability to
link does provide the linking site with the ability to free-ride on
the information contained at the linked site. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to see how that free-riding constitutes misappropria-
tion since the linker simply directs the user to content that the
plaintiff usually freely gives away.
Even if the linker's conduct is considered misappropria-
tion, such claims are likely to founder on the fourth or fifth
elements of the Motorola test. The fourth element is the exis-
tence of direct competition between the plaintiff and defendant.
Often, a link functions simply as a pointer to related informa-
tion. This seems to have been the case in Ticketmaster. Micro-
soft's product was a city guide that happened to contain infor-
mation on local events, including where to buy tickets.
Ticketmaster's product was event information as well as ticket
sales. If users wanted to buy tickets, they had to go to the
Ticketmaster site, either directly or by linking.
At first blush, it seems that the Total News site and the
news organizations' sites were direct competitors. All of the
sites offered the news of the day. However, a closer look at the
products suggests a different conclusion. The Total News
product was not the news. Instead, it was an index to the
news. Also, the complaint was not really about the misappro-
399. See id. at 853. While the court makes this assertion, it is questionable
whether, in fact, it is correct. See JANE C. GINSBuRG, COPYRIGHT, COMMON
LAW AND Sui GENERIs PROTECTION OF DATABASES IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD,
17-18 (1997) (on file with author).
400. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 853.
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priation of content; it was about Total News diverting advertising
dollars by using frames. By placing ads next to the frames of
the plaintiffs' sites, Total News made it look like the ads ac-
tually appeared on the plaintiffs' sites rather than the Total
News site. The misappropriation argument is thus derivative:
"Defendants directly compete for advertising revenue with
Plaintiffs, and Defendants' business-the sale of advertising
space-depends entirely on the commercial value of the news
and other material appearing on Plaintiffs' websites."
40 1
If the test for misappropriation is direct competition for
the same advertising dollars, then almost any web site using
the advertising-based revenue model and linking to another site
on the same model misappropriates the linked site's content.
In other words, the competition for Internet advertising dollars
is fierce, and the market is segmented more by site traffic than
it is by product. Thus, sites with noncompetitive information
may compete for the same advertising dollars. The test then
should perhaps be whether the plaintiff and defendant compete
directly with each other in providing the particular information
on the web and whether they compete for the same pool of ad-
vertising money. Total News may pass this test while Ticket-
master would not.
The final hurdle for a plaintiff in a misappropriation case
is to demonstrate that the defendant's free-riding threatens the
quality or very existence of the plaintiffs product. The court
did not provide guidance as to how a plaintiff would go about
proving such a threat.
In fact, it seems rather unlikely that linking generally
would threaten the existence of the plaintiffs product because
a generic HREF link actually enhances the use of the linked
site and the market for its products. It is somewhat more ten-
able to argue that the free-riding involved in framing could
threaten the plaintiff site's existence. However, it is unlikely
that most plaintiffs would pass this final requirement given
that (i) it is fairly inexpensive to publish a web site; (ii) the
marginal cost of distributing the information on the web is
near zero; and (iii) web publishers often derive revenue from
ancillary services other than advertising.402
401. Washington Post, Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) 41
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1997).
402. See Schlachter, supra note 71, at 22-30 (explaining that the marginal
cost of Internet distribution is near zero, that this low cost enables content
providers to make information available for free, and that fixed costs are re-
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This is not to say, however, that misappropriation actions
based on conduct on the Internet will never be successful, par-
ticularly since there is no assurance that courts outside the
Second Circuit will adopt the Motorola test. Instead, it suggests
that only a few misappropriation actions will survive a Mo-
torola test in jurisdictions in which that approach is adopted.
However, in cases where there is some confidential relation-
ship between the parties conducting the electronic transaction,
traditional misappropriation doctrine should still apply even in
Motorola jurisdictions, and such a claim should survive a
copyright preemption challenge. This is most likely to occur
when the parties have entered into a true contract.
VI. THE "ZONING" OF THE INTERNET
The preceding analysis suggests that linking should gen-
erally be permissible under copyright law and that trademark
law should be narrowly interpreted to limit linking only in
cases involving consumer confusion. Additionally, it suggests
that, while electronic contracts should generally be enforceable,
boilerplate legends prohibiting linking should be preempted by
copyright law, at least in a noncommercial setting. Finally, it
concludes that many misappropriation actions are likely to be
preempted by copyright law.
While the analysis focuses on the narrow issue of linking,
it offers some insight into the broader question of how the In-
ternet is likely to evolve over time. At a superficial level, the
analysis demonstrates how legal arguments are entwined with
an understanding of the technology and highlights the ques-
tion of whether the state of technology should influence the
selection of legal rules. At a deeper level, it predicts that the
Internet is likely to evolve into a "zoned" system with both
open and closed areas.0 3
When commercial web publishers post information, they
consider the value of that information itself as well as the
covered through other services in addition to advertising).
403. See Perritt, supra note 4, at 323-24 (discussing the "[fluture of [olpen
[slystems" and predicting the "merger of... open and closed architectures" as
"new Internet technologies likely will permit certain features of [the ap-
proaches of closed systems] to exist alongside traditional open architectures in
the Interne"); see generally Lessig, supra note 4, at 1408-11 ("[There is a
movement] to increase the sophistication of the architecture in cyberspace, to
facilitate boundaries rather than borders. It is the movement to bring zoning
to cyberspace.... One alternative [for cyberspace] is an open space; the other
closed [,although] these are [not] the only choices.").
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manner that they plan to profit from the availability of that in-
formation on the Internet. For example, a web site may con-
tain product information. The site owner may seek revenue
from product sales or sales of value-added services, but not
from sales of the posted information itself. Instead, the site
owner distributes that information for free because the broader
the dissemination of the information, the higher the revenue
realized on sales.4" In contrast, a web site that is the elec-
tronic equivalent of a magazine may seek revenue from sub-
scriptions. There, the value of the site is based both on its con-
tent and the Internet's ability to reach a large number of
customers. The information itself has value for which users
are willing to pay.40
5
When posting information, web publishers also consider
what means are available to prevent others from using the in-
formation in an unauthorized manner. These means include
both legal and technological protections.40 6 Intuitively, public
intellectual property law would seem to provide the cheapest
legal protection. Web publishers would not have to do any-
thing more than meet the relevant statutory requirements for
protection to obtain certain legal rights.
It would probably be somewhat more expensive for site
owners to protect their information through the private law of
contract. Even if a boilerplate form were used, site owners
would still have to expend resources to draft and post it. How-
ever, there may be enforcement advantages to using contract to
supplement intellectual property protection because a breach
of contract claim may simply be easier and cheaper to maintain
than an action for infringement.
In addition to relying on public and private law to protect
information, providers may also engage in self-help by building
technological protections against unauthorized use. Techno-
logical fixes may or may not be more expensive than relying on
public or private law.40 7 However, it seems likely that in many
404. See generally Hardy, supra note 3, at 221 (stating that companies may
not be concerned about restricting the copying of advertising materials).
405. See generally id. (stating that, while companies may not object to the
copying of their advertising materials, they "would certainly want to prevent
the copying of its updating database-the means by which it stays in busi-
ness").
406. See supra note 8.
407. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 247 (discussing technological means of
detecting unauthorized access and stating that "we cannot be sure that the
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cases, technology will in fact be a cheaper alternative since the
more effective the technology, the less likely any litigation with
its concomitant high costs, would occur.
408
Obviously, the less valuable the information, the fewer the
protections the 'site owner is likely to view as cost-effective. For
example, the owner of the site containing product information is
quite likely solely to rely on public intellectual property law to
protect that information. In contrast, the more valuable the in-
formation, the more expense the site owner will be willing to incur
to safeguard it. For example, the publisher of the electronic
magazine may use both private contract and technological pro-
tections to safeguard against unauthorized access and use.
Consequently, the Internet is likely to evolve into a "place"
characterized by both open and closed areas. The open areas
are likely to contain less valuable information and be charac-
terized by reliance on public intellectual property law. Inhabi-
tants of the open areas, if they seek income at all, will probably
derive it from value-added services rather than from content
itself. The closed areas are likely to contain the most valuable
information and be characterized by both contractual and
technological restrictions. As fencing technology declines in
cost, its use is likely to increase, leading to more partially
closed areas of the Internet.409 However, ultimately, the mar-
ket will determine which sites are open and which closed.410
costs of detecting information-property 'trespasses' will be excessive").
408. See generally Lessig, supra note 4, at 1410 (noting the importance of
engineers in determining the shape of the Internet since "[elngineers write
the code; the code defines the architectures, and the architectures define what
is possible within a certain social space").
409. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 235 (citing Professor Ellickson to support
the proposition that "as the costs of drawing, monitoring, and preventing en-
try to property fall, one can predict an increase in the amount of
'parcelization' of property") (footnote omitted).
410. See Grogan, supra note 205, at 5 ("Many sites will opt not to use con-
tractual protections because requiring the user to assent to a contract is likely
to discourage some users from using the site .... Any barriers that impede a
user's access to and utilization of the web site may reduce traffic to the site,
with concomitant reductions in advertising revenues, electronic commerce
sales, and other potentially profit-making activities emanating from such
traffic."). But see Lessig, supra note 4, at 1411 ("Individual choice might ag-
gregate in a way that individuals collectively do not want. Individual choices
are made within a particular architecture; but they may yield an architecture
different from what the collective might want.... [A] perfect technology of
control does not entail a perfect technology of justice, and it is this that com-
mends a continual check.").
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The implication for lawmakers is largely a passive one.
Regulators could force sites to be more or less "open," but this
seems particularly inappropriate in a new medium character-
ized both by rapidly changing technology and relatively low
transaction costs. Instead, the better approach is one that al-
lows the Internet to evolve against the backdrop of current law
with the minor adjustments suggested above.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is still evolving as a medium of broad-based
communication. While the law will undeniably have some role
in the shape of the Internet, technology will largely determine its
future direction simply because technology develops much faster
than the law. The real challenge for the law will be in helping
the Internet to realize its potential as the new "marketplace of
ideas" in a manner that maximizes the quality and quantity of
information available while recognizing the legitimate inter-
ests of both information consumers and providers.
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